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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Paul R. Baier* 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION 
Judge Irving Goldberg's opm1on in Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas,1 which addresses mental retarda­
tion and equal protection, reflects the heroism of a hundred years 
ago and the same rock-like sense of justice that makes a judge 
great. All who labor in the Fifth Circuit, bench and bar alike, can 
he proud of this one. 
The Fifth Circuit, in Cleburne Living Center, held that classi­
fications based on mental retardation are "quasi-suspect."2 "Dis­
crimination against the mentally retarded is likely to reflect deep­
seated prejudice. They have been subjected to a history of unfair 
and often grotesque mistreatment,"3 said Judge Goldberg. Men­
tally handicapped people have been segregated in remote, stigma­
tizing institutions; they possess relatively little political power; 
their condition is immutable; popular fears and uncertainty about 
them abound:' Indeed, the Third Circuit has opined that "[t]he 
mentally retarded may well be a paradigmatic example of a dis­
crete and insular minority for whom the judiciary should exercise 
• Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. Member 
of the Louisiana Bar and the Bar of the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals. Edi­
tor, MR. JusTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 
(Random House 1986). 
The author wishes to thank Mr. Gerald Walton, Assistant Vice Chancellor for Academic 
Affairs, the University of Mississippi, for his historical diggings on the antifraternity agita­
tion during Chancellor Kincannon's administration at Ole Miss. And, as always, the author 
is deeply indebted to Charlotte Melius, Madeline Hebert, and Isabel Wingerter, all excellent 
law librarians, for their friendship and help with the books. 
l. 726 F'.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). 
2. [W]e hold that mental retardate� constitute a "quasi-suspect" class; and, there­
fore, we test the ordinance according to the "intermediate" level of scrutiny estab­
lished by the Supreme Court. Because the city has failed to prove that the ordinance 
substantially furthers a significant governmental interest, we hold that the ordinance 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
726 F.2d at 193. 
3. Id. at 197. 
4. Id. at 197-98. 
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special solicitude."6 The reference,. of course, is to Carolen_e Prod­ucts' footnote four ,6 which has achieved a measured followmg over 
the years as documented in l�st year's
. 
Sy"!posium: 7 �hat all. 
�his 
means is that the combination of h1stor1cal preJud1ce, political 
powerlessness, and immutability "calls for heightened scrutiny of 
classifications discriminating against the mentally retarded."s 
Heightened scrutiny is neither the strictest, generally lethal stan­
dard of review, nor the mildest standard, the test of "mere ration­
ality. "9 Instead, it is an intermediate level established by the Su­
preme Court and employed by the Fifth Circuit to test the Texas 
City ordinance. 
At this point I'm sure the usual formulae of equal protection 
review are rolling around in the reader's head. Formulaic analysis, 
however, sometimes gets you into trouble, as we shall see in a 
moment. 
And what was the disadvantaging classification? The city of 
Cleburne required a special use permit before the mentally re­
tarded could live together in a group home. However, the city did 
not require such permits for other groups, such as fraternities. The 
panel responded accordingly to this restriction: "Because the city 
has failed to prove that the ordinance substantially furthers a sig­
nificant governmental interest, we hold that the ordinance violates 
the Equal Protection Clause."1° None of the city's asserted goals, 
such as avoiding traffic congestion, was substantially served by the 
ordinance. As a result, the ordinance was deemed unconstitutional 
on its face and as applied.11 Moreover, the "standardless require­
ment" of a special permit was "both vastly overbroad and vastly 
underinclusive, "12 a damning facial flaw according to the court. In 
addition, nothing in the record indicated that mentally retarded 
5. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 163 n.35 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated and 
remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
. 6. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), especially the t�ird paragraph of the note, which speaks of "prejudice against discrete and insular minori­
ties" as a "special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of t hose political 
proces_ses ordinarily to be relied upon. to protect minorities, and which may call for a corre­
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 
· 7. See Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional Law 30 Lov L REV 6 19 621-22 (1984). ' . . . ' 
8. Cleburne Living Center, 726 F.2d at 198. 
9. Id. at 193. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 200. 
12. Id. 
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persons living in group homes are more disruptive or dangerous 
than other people. Cleburne's ordinance was bad on its face: 
There is too great a potential for blanket discrimination, fueled by 
the very fears and prejudices that drove neighbors in this case to 
petition the City Council against the Featherson Home. We cannot 
sanction such unbridled discretion in dealing with a class that has 
suffered a history of mistreatment and political impotence. 18 
This is a bold stroke from a court whose canvassing of equality 
under the law has made it noble. This is high praise to be sure. But 
the court deserves it. Where else can these victims of public 
prejudice take refuge if not under the aegis of judges like Irving 
Goldberg? 
Testing Cleburne's ordinance under intermediate scrutiny, the 
panel also condemned the ordinance "as applied," thereby overrul­
ing the City Council's administrative decision to deny a permit in 
this specific instance. After reviewing each of the factors involved 
in the Council's decision, Judge Goldberg concluded that "none of 
the proferred reasons for denying the Featherston permit substan­
tially served an important government interest. "1' For example, 
the City argued that the residents of the Featherston Home would 
be too crowded. But what about fraternity brothers squeezing to­
gether? "The City never justifies its apparent view that other peo­
ple can live under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally re­
tarded persons cannot."1& And Cleburne's argument "that the 
[Featherston] Home would be in a 500 year flood plain seems 
somewhat strained. "18 With commendable restraint, the panel 
noted that "[t]hough the safety of the residents is important, the 
danger of a flood every five hundred years is not particularly 
great."11 As to the negative attitudes of adjacent property owners, 
Judge Goldberg responded bluntly: "The prejudices and fears of 
neighbors are not in themselves legitimate bases for discrimina­
tion. "18 Otherwise, "prejudice becomes its own excuse."19 
Cleburne Living Center is a courageous opinion from a protec­
tive panel of judges. It reflects the shielding role of courts under 
13. Id. at 201. 
14. Id. at 202. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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our constitutional system. It recalJs the efforts of earlier judicial 
heroes who, by virtue of their judicial c o?1missio�, �ought to pro­
tect weak and helpless human beings a gamst pre1ud1c e  and public 
excitement. 
Rehearing en bane was denied by the full Fifth Circuit, but 
only by the thinnest of margins, eight to seven.20 Judge Garwood 
thought the Cleburne panel had gone too far, and he said so in his 
straight-forward fashion: "The mentally retarded present a wholly 
distinct situation. They are materially different from the rest of 
society, and are so as a result of their class-defining characteris­
tics."21 As a result, Judge Garwood thought ill-advised the panel's 
novel rule that classification based on mental retardation is "quasi 
suspect." State regulations inevitably distinguish between the re­
tarded and others. To strike them down on the basis of the same 
test used to judge distinctions based on gender "constitutes ... a 
major and unwarranted extension of federal judicial power, to the 
substantial prejudice both of the judicial function and the princi­
ples of federalism."22 Judge Garwood's conclusion was a flag to the 
Supreme Court: "The unprecedented rule announced by the panel 
tells us, I fear, significantly more about the institutional powers of 
the federal judiciary than it does about the proper state treatment 
of the retarded. "23 
It is probable that Judge Garwood's cautionary remark influ­
enced the Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Justice White, writ­
ing for six justices, rejected the panel's holding that mental retar­
dation is a quasi-suspect classification. 2' The majority's reasoning 
mirrors Judge Garwood's thinking. The mentally retarded are dif­
ferent; they have "distinguishing characteristics relevant to inter­
ests the state has the authority to implement."211 Furthermore, Jus­
tice White urged caution, not judicial innovation: 
Ho� this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is 
a difficult and often a technical matter, very much a task for legisla-
20. 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984). 
21. Id. at 833 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
22. Id. at 834. 
23. Id. 
24. City 0� CI�burne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center 105 S. Ct. 3249 ( 1985), aff'g in pa
h
rt and vacating in part, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984): "We conclude for several reasons t at the Court of Appeals err d · h Id' . . . all' � e m o mg mental retardation a quasi-suspect class1ficat1on c mg tor a more exacting standard f . d' 'al . and 'al 1 . 1 . 0 JU 1c1 review than is normally accorded economic soc1 eg1s ation." 105 S. Ct. at 3255-&6 25. 105 S. Ct. at 3255. . 
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tors guided by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill­
informed opinions of the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably 
involves substantive judgments about legis lative decisions, and we 
doubt that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where 
the classification deals with mental retardation. 11 
Moreover, national and state legislative efforts to aid the men­
tally retarded "negate[] any claim that the mentally retarded are 
politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to at­
tract the attention of the lawmakers. "17 The Court dismissed the 
panel's conclusion of facial unconstitutionality because the Court 
would not "presume that any given legislative action, even one that 
disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that 
the Constitution will not tolerate. "18 The Court held that the 
proper way to remedy invidious discrimination against the re­
tarded did not lie in  creating a "new quasi-suspect classification 
and subject[ing] all governmental action based on that classifica­
tion to more searching evaluation. "19 Rather, it suffices to apply 
the rational basis test of old: "To withstand equal protection re­
view, legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded 
and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose."30 
Id. 
From this point forward, the Supreme Court followed the 
26. Id. at 3256. 
27. Id. at 3257. 
28. Id. at 3258. 
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately 
take into account in a wide range of decisions, and because both state and federal 
governments have recently committed themselves to 888isting the retarded, we will 
not presume that any given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded 
individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. "This standard," said the Supreme Court's majority opinion, "atfords govem­
?1ent the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to 888ist the retarded in realiz­
ing their full potential, and to freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the 
retarded in what is essentially an incidental manner." Id. The Court cautioned, however, 
that refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely 
unprotected from individious discrimination: 
The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so 
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. Furthermore, some 
objectives-such as "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group"-are 
not legitimate state interests. Beyond that, the mentally retarded, like others, have 
and retain their substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be treated equally by the law. Id. (citations omitted). 
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Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the panel's conclusion that the 
Cleburne ordinance was unconstitutional as applied: "Because in 
our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing 
that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the 
city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as 
it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case. "31 This was 
at least a half-victory for the panel. 
Some students of equal protection may find it strange that the 
Cleburne ordinance failed the mere rationality test. They would 
say the scrutiny applied by the Supreme Court in fact seems 
stricter than that usually associated with the "champagne prom­
ise "32 of rationality review. Doubtless there is some truth to the 
allegation. But this is not the place to discourse at length on the 
right test to apply to classifications disadvantaging the m entally 
retarded. Formulae are important, to be sure, if we are to have 
equal justice under law. Nevertheless, a court's sense of justice 
may have a good deal more to do with constitutional adjudication 
than is customarily acknowledged in the reports. Cleburne Living 
Center proves that magic formulae are not good substitutes for ju­
dicial judgment, especially when it comes to guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws. This is a lesson that too few students, I'm 
afraid, ever grasp. 
31. Id. at 3259. 
32. "Old equal protection, it is fair to say, was no protection at all; the rational basis 
test was a mere champagne promise." Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional Law, 
30 LOY. L. REv. 619 (1984). Dissenting in the Cleburne case, Justice Marshall, joined by 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, thought the majority's "rational basis" rationale p uzzling: 
"The Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational basis grounds and disclaims that any­
thing special, in the form of heightened scrutiny, is taking place . Yet Cleburne's ordinance 
surely would be valid under the traditional rational basis test applicable to economic and 
commercial regulation." 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). Most second-year law students who have studied the law of equal protection would 
probably agree with Justice Marshall's observation: 
Cleb�n�'s or
.
dinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely the sort of 
probmg mqwry associated with heightened scrutiny. To be sure the Court does not 
label its handiwork heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must �ere�
.
fter be called "second order" rational basis review rather than "heightened scru­tiny. But �owever �abelled, the rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational basis test of Williamson u. Lee Optical . . .  and [its] progeny. 
Id. at 3264 (citations omitted). 
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II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
A. Public Employment 
645 
Ardith McPherson, like so many public employees of late, 
owes her continued government employment to the sensitivity of 
the Fifth Circuit and to Judge Tate, who reversed a summary judg­
ment against her. McPherson v. Rankin38 is one of many public 
employee lawsuits requiring judges to apply the burgeoning law 
addressing the free speech of public employees, in particular, the 
"Pickering balancing test":u "To arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the [employee] , as a citizen, in commenting upon mat­
ters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an em­
ployer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees."311 
McPherson was fired from her job as a deputy constable for a 
remark she made after hearing of the attempted assassination of 
President Reagan. "[l] f they go for him again, I hope they get 
him,"36 she told a co-worker at lunch. The remark capped what 
McPherson thought was a private tete-a-tete expressing opposition 
to the President's policies on welfare and unemployment. The trial 
court thought McPherson's remark unprotected as a matter of law, 
but the appeals panel identified several issues of material fact pre­
cluding summary judgment. 
For example, a dispute focused on whether McPherson in­
tended her remark to be taken seriously. Constable Rankin 
thought she was serious; McPherson testified, "I didn't mean any­
thing by it."37 Obviously, a crucial fact is in dispute here and sum­
mary judgment is not appropriate. As the panel points out, "[t]he 
issue of McPherson's intent is relevant to the present inquiry be­
cause it is imperative that a court's characterization of speech as 
political expression, for purposes of First Amendment protection, 
33. 736 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1984). 
34. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Court held that a public 
employee does not relinquish first amendment rights to comment on matters of public inter­
est by virtue of government em ployment. The Court recognized that the state's interests "as 
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees . . . differ significantly from those it 
J>Ossesses in connection with regulation of speech of the citizenry in general." Id. at 568. 
Judge Higginbotham's keen dissection of the Pickering balance in Gonzales v. Benavides, 
712 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1983) is required reading on this subject in the Fifth Circuit. 
35. 391 U.S. at 568. 
36. 736 F. 2d at 177 . 
37. Id. n.3. 
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be predicated upon consideration of its 'content, form, and con­
text.' "38 The context of the speech-including an e�ployee's mo­
tive in making it-is especially material when pubhc employees 
speak privately on the job. 39 If McPherson truly meant her remark 
as a form of political hyperbole, not as advocacy of harm t o  the 
President, then the Pickering balance would seem to weigh in her 
favor. But first, as Judge Tate makes abundantly clear, the true 
facts must be determined after trial on the merits. Summary judg­
ment is simply too blunt an instrument in these public employee, 
free speech cases. Balancing the competing interests requires a ra­
zor, not a meat axe, even in the face of a public employee's blunt 
tongue. 
By way of contrast, the trial court in Solis v. Rio Grande City 
Independent School"0 allowed the jury to decide whether the polit­
ical activities of Amanda Solis and three other school teach­
ers-their support for opposition school board candidates-was a 
substantial and motivating factor in the refusal of the school board 
to give these teachers their usual summer jobs. The jury answered 
"Yes" to special interrogatories and awarded plaintiffs $5,900 for 
lost wages and $100,000 for "humiliation, embarrassment and con­
cern" flowing from the violation of their constitutional rights. Of 
course the first amendment protects public employees' campaign­
ing activities as a form of protected speech, although the precise 
scope of the protection-the McBee balance in the Fifth Cir­
cuit-remains cloudy. 41 
Solis v. Rio Grande City Independent School turns on the 
second prong of the Mt. Healthy two-part test; that is, "whether 
the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have reached the same decision as to [plaintiffs'] reemploy-
38. Id. at 178-79 (quoting Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)). 
730 :92 
On this point, Ju�ge Tate refers the reader to McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Texas, 
. 
: .d 1009, 1013 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (balancing factors include employee's motives 
m vo1cmg the expressions at issue and their context). 736 F.2d at 179. 
40. 734 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. (1984). 
41. See McBee discussed in Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional Law, 30 
Lov. L . . REv. 619, 630-39 (1984). For criticism of the McBee balancing act, from the pen of a �rceptive student, see Note, M�Bee v. �im !f ogg County: On Balance A Risky Business, 45 
C. 
· L: R
.
�v. 109� (19�5). The Eighth Circuit's approach differs from the law of the Fifth ircmt: The Pickering balan 
· test d . 
d 
cmg nee not be used m determining whether the first 
�:� ment pro�cts political affiliation." Barnes v. Bosley, 745 F.2d 501, 506 (8th Cir. 
' c�\ denied, 105 S. Ct. 2022 (1985). Undoubtedly, given the conflicting approaches among
f
t 
h
e 
1
ederal circuits, the Supreme Court will eventually have to return to this murky area o t e aw. 
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ment even in the absence of the protected conduct.""2 As the Fifth 
Circuit has said, "[the Mt. Healthy charge] is succinct and clear."43 
And yet the trial court "submitted no special question [to the jury] 
which under any reading could encompass the second inquiry of 
Mt. Healthy or permit a definitive answer on that question by the 
jury."44 The defendants requested an interrogatory on this point, 
thereby preserving their objection to the trial court's failure to 
charge on the second prong. 
Judge Brown had no alternative but to reverse, notwithstand­
ing that "this Court is particularly chary of disturbing a jury ver­
dict rendered after a full trial.""6 The opinion is a loud admonition 
to the trial bench. A proper Mt. Healthy charge is simple. "It 
should be given,""6 no ifs, and's, or hut's about it. And Judge 
Brown's opinion also sounds a cautionary note to the trial bar who 
litigate these political retaliation cases: labor over your proposed 
instructions carefully, lest an appellate court rob you of a $100,000 
jury verdict. 
Remanding the case for a new trial, the panel announced that 
"because factors [1] and [2] of Mt. Healthy are inseparably inter­
twined, both should be retried. "47 The court also hinted that the 
jury's quantum may have been too great: "Of course, damages may 
be awarded for embarrassment or mental distress resulting from a 
deprivation of constitutional rights. Absent proof of actual injury, 
however, only nominal damages may be awarded for violation of 
constitutional rights. "48 Although plaintiffs testified to varying de­
grees of depression, feeling "letdown" and "very, very sad," the 
panel emphasized that "[n]o proof of any physical manifestations 
of plaintiffs' asserted depression and embarrassment was given at 
trial."49 Since the court reached out to discuss the issue of "Exces­
sive Damages," one suspects that the reviewing judges were un-
42. 734 F.2d at 246 (quoting Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)). The first prong requires plaintiff to prove "that his conduct was con­
stitutionally protected, and that 'this conduct was a "substantial factor" or, to put it in 
other words, that it was a "motivating factor" in the Board's decision not to rehire him.' " 
734 F.2d at 246 (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287) (footnote omitted by Fifth Circuit). 
43. Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 497 (5th Cir. 1983) (Rubin, J., specially 
concurring). 
44. 734 F.2d at 249. 
45. Id. at 245. 
46. Id. at 250. 
47. Id. (footnote omitted). 
48. Id. (citations omitted). 
49. Id. at 251. 
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happy with the jury's generosity. 60 
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The jury was properly charged on both prongs 
. 
of 
. 
th;
1 
Mt. 
Healthy test in Wells v. Hico Independent School District, an­
other school teacher, refusal-to-rehire case. The jury returned a 
verdict on first amendment grounds in plaintiff's favor and the ap­
pellate court affirmed, finding "at least some evidence that a mate­
rial portion of [ the teacher's] speech pertained to matters of public 
concern, and did not relate only to matters of exclusively personal 
interest, within the rule of Connick. "62 The teachers involved had 
spoken out in favor of the federally funded "Right to Read" pro­
gram, a subject of debate in the community. 
Defendants' failure to move for a directed verdict in the dis­
trict court left the appellate court with only the narrowest respon­
sibility: "Because appellants wholly failed to in any manner pre­
serve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to support plaintiffs' 
First Amendment claims, we must affirm the jury verdict in this 
respect if there is any evidence to support it."113 Applying this "dis­
tinctly limited standard of review,"6" the court found "at least 
some evidence that this protected speech of plaintiffs was a moti­
vating factor in their nonrenewal. Nor does the evidence conclu­
sively show that nonrenewal would have occurred absent such pro­
tected speech."H The teachers were ordered reinstated with back 
pay, although the award of punitive damages against individual 
Board members was reversed since "there is absolutely no evidence 
that the individual Board members acted with malice or with a 
'reckless or callous disregard' for plaintiffs' [first amendment] 
rights in this connection. "116 
B. Medical Staff Privileges 
Daly v. Sprague67 returned to the Fifth Circuit this term. A 
50. Id. at 250. The issue of "Excessive Damages" was separately stated and separately 
considered at the conclusion of Judge Brown's opinion. 
51. 736 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 111 (1985). 
52. 736 .F.2d at 249 (emphasis in original) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). 
53. 736 F.2d at 249 (emphasis in original). 
54. Id. at 250. 
55. Id. at 249. 
56. Id. at 259, applying the rule of Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983), that only a 
"reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of 
federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury's consideration of the appropriateness of 
punitive damages." 
57. 742 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1984). For the first round, see Daly v. Sprague, 675 F.2d 716 
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state-operated teaching hospital suspended Dr. Daly's clinical staff 
privileges and denied him communication with his hospital pa­
tients. On appeal a second time, the court curtly rejected the doc­
tor's first amendment challenge stating that "[i]t is beyond dispute 
that a state operated hospital has the right, and the duty, to regu­
late the conduct of its physicians. Limitations on professional con­
duct necessarily affect the use of language and association; accord­
ingly, reasonable restraints on the practice of medicine and 
professional actions cannot be defeated b y  pointing to the fact that 
communication is involved."118 A doctor's intention to speak and 
associate with his hospital patients "is clearly subsumed within 
and subservient to the regulation of medical practitioners in state 
hospitals."119 Dr. Daly was not forced to relinquish his first amend­
ment rights as a private citizen, "[o]nly those state clinical privi­
leges extended to him as a physician-employee of the medical 
center. "80 In rejecting the physician's claim, the court indicated 
that there are "substantial limits"61 placed on the extent to which 
a public hospital's decisions may be restrained on first amendment 
grounds. In a cautious remark, the Fifth Circuit noted that "courts 
should not intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in 
the daily operation of [public hospital systems] unless basic consti­
tutional values are directly and sharply implicated."62 
And in another case involving a suspended physician, Davis v. 
West Community Hospital,63 the Fifth Circuit held that the 
speech in question was unprotected as a matter of law, because it 
concerned only personal grievances outside the coverage of the first 
amendment. The Davis panel adopted the Ninth Circuit's formula­
tion of the Connick v. Meyers64 inquiry as follows: 
Speech by public employees may be characterized as not of "public 
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1047 (1983), discussed in Baier, Fifth Circuit Sympo­
sium: Constitutional Law, 29 Lov. L. REv. 647, 674-76 (1983). 
58. 742 F.2d at 898. 
59. Id. at 899 
60. Id. (footnote omitted). 
61. Id. n.5 (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982)). 
62. 742 F.2d at 899 n.5. 
Pico further illustrates that courts should not intervene in the resolution of conflicts 
which arise in the daily operation of school systems unless basic constitutional values 
are directly and sharply implicated. The same considerations appear to apply to the 
univeraity medical center in view of the state's extensive authority to regulate the 
practice of medicine. 
63. 755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985). 
64. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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concern" when it is clear that such speech deals with individual per­
sonnel disputes and grievances and t hat the information would be of 
no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of govern­
mental agencies. On the other hand, speech that concerns ''issues 
about which information is needed or appropriate to en able the 
members of society" to make informed decisions about the operation 
of their government merits the highest degree of first amendment 
protection. 611 
Dr. Davis's in-house complaints about his co-workers and hospital 
administrators, " [ c ]onsidered in their entire context, "66 did not 
"fall under the rubric of matters o f  public concern but, instead, 
f 1 . t t "67 falls under the banner of matters o pure persona m eres . 
Hence a jury verdict for Dr. Davis on his first amendment claim 
was reversed as a matter of law. 
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS 
Public employment impli�ates two constitutionally protected 
substantive interests: "property" defined by reference to state 
law,68 and "liberty" defined by the federal judiciary.69 Wells v. 
65. 755 F.2d at 461 (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 
1983)) (citations omitted by Fifth Circuit). 
66. 755 F.2d at 461. 
67. Id. 
68. Per Stewart, J., for the Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972): 
Property interests, of course, arc not created by the Constitution. Rather, they 
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that 
stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that 
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. 
Some commentators question the idea that constitutional "property" should be determined 
exclusively by reference to state law. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 COR­
NELL L. REV. 405, 434-39 (1977). Regardless of what one thinks of the idea that property 
interests are not created by the Constitution, certainly the Fifth Circuit is obliged to follow 
the law-however well or poorly the Supreme Court declares it. And the Fifth Circuit has 
fallen in line on this matter of constitutional property: "[W]e look to state law for the exis­
tence of a property interest." Daly v. Sprague, 675 F.2d 716, 727 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Moore v. Otero, 557 F.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 1977)), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1047 (1983). 
69. The locus classicus, of course, is Mr. Justice McReynolds's ex cathedra declara­
tion in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (citation omitted): 
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration, and some of the included 
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any 
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
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Hico Independent School District70 is a good example of public 
employee claims of abridgment of property and liberty interests. 
The school teachers involved worked under one-year contracts of 
employment which were not renewed. The jury found that plain­
tiffs' property interests had been violated since the school district 
had failed to follow its own grievance procedures in refusing to  re­
new plaintiffs' contracts. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the District's grievance policies "cre­
ated an expectation of continued employment amounting to a 
property right," relying on the Supreme Court's recognition that 
state institutions through their own internal employment policies 
may "give rise to a state law implied contractual right based on 
'mutually explicit understandings.' "71 This is a fine legal theory 
which captured the jury's fancy. However, in due course, the ap­
pellate court rescued the School District, holding that the facts 
simply did not fit any property interest theory of the case. Accord­
ing to the panel, the School District's grievance policies relate 
solely to processing employee grievances; they do not limit the Dis­
trict in its relations with its employees. "This policy says nothing 
about either discharge or nonrenewal of any employee. "72 Hence, 
"it is plain, we believe, that the School District's grievance policy 
could not and did not implicate a property interest on the part of 
Mrs. Braune and Mrs. Wells. "73 
Furthermore, under Texas law, which the Hico panel followed 
as controlling, the School District operated under fixed term con­
tracts for its teachers, not continuing contract provisions that cre­
ate tenure for those Texas school districts which opt for it. The 
Fifth Circuit has ruled that school districts not adopting Texas' 
continuing contract law cannot create an implied contractual right 
to reemployment by their internal policies and practices. 74 Said 
Judge Garwood on· appeal, "it is wholly unreasonable to read en­
tirely by implication into these policies . . . a purportedly binding 
restriction on the otherwise plenary power of the School Board to 
elect not to renew plaintiffs' contracts at the expiration of their 
conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
70. 736 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984). 
71. Id. at 252 & n.12 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 60 1 (1972)). 
72. 736 F.2d at 254 (emphasis in original). 
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
· 
74. Burris v. Willis Indep. School Dist., 713 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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terms."76 As a matter of law, therefore, the district court erred in 
submitting the property interest theory to the jury. Judge ?a�­
wood's decision on this aspect of the case is as sound as it is 
straightforward, although plaintiffs' counsel should be commended 
for what was a good try below. 
Focusing on the liberty aspect of Hico reveals a strange affair 
indeed. The jury, obviously sympathetic to the teachers involved, 
also found that plaintiffs' liberty interests were abridged, although 
they were never told "what is necessary in order for that to be 
so."76 It is possible that the jury may have thought that nonre­
newal alone was enough to invoke a liberty interest. Judge Gar­
wood's restrained reaction on appeal-his quiet correction of glar­
ing error-is commendable. Doubtless he is right to say that "there 
is a general public commonsense perception that the loss of one's 
job can be stigmatizing in itself."77 However, this result is insuffi­
cient to raise a protected liberty interest. "[T]he law requires more 
than mere nonrenewal to find a liberty deprivation .. . "78 Be­
cause the common sense of the public is not the law of the Consti­
tution, at least not in this area of public employee "liberty," Judge 
Garwood's opinion cautions the trial bench to instruct the jury 
carefully on the legal elements of a liberty deprivation. If not, re­
versal is mandated. 
And what are the necessary elements of a liberty claim? Judge 
Garwood's recitation is a tight compendium of controlling law that 
lawyers and law students would d o  well to heed. First, the em­
ployee must show that his employer has brought false charges 
against him that "might seriously damage his standing and as­
sociations in his community."79 Nonrenewal alone "is not such a 
blight upon his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity as to 
constitute a deprivation of liberty."80 The required stigma-be-
Id. 
75. 736 F.2d at 255. The court continued: 
Our Burris decision controls. Neither the referenced policies nor any other evidence 
justifies the conclusion that plaintiffs had, under Texas law, any property interest in 
their teaching positions extending beyond the one-year terms of their contracts with 
this School District which operated under the statutory nontenure system. Because 
there was insufficient evidence of a property interest the district court erred in sub-
mitting the property interest theory to the jury. 
' 
76. Id. at 258 (emphasis in original). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S 564, 573 (1972). 
80. Dennis v. S & S Consol. Rural High School Dist., 577 F.2d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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yond nonrenewal-"must be imposed by the state in connection 
with its denial of a right or status previously recognized by state 
law,"81 although "loss of a property interest (such as tenured em­
ployment) is not required. "82 The specific kinds of state rights or 
status the court demands is not exactly clear. The required stigma­
tization must be "in or as a result of the discharge process."83 The 
aggrieved employee must show that the governmental agency has 
made or is likely to make its charges public "in any official or in­
tentional manner, other than in connection with the defense of [re­
lated legal] action."84 Also, "the employee must not have received a 
meaningful hearing to clear his name. "86 And finally, " [ t] he 
charges must be false. "88 
Nothing in the evidence in Hico linked the Board to any stig­
matizing charges against plaintiffs. "There is no evidence that the 
Board members or the District administration did anything in this 
regard other than listen to the grievance of the other teachers; 
nothing purporting to constitute Board or District administration 
action on this grievance is shown to have occurred. "87 Further­
more, the jury was not instructed, as it should have been, that any 
stigmatizing "charges" against the plaintiffs "must have been made 
or approved by the defendants and made (or likely to be made) 
public by them."88 These errors required a reversal and remand for 
a new trial on the liberty interest claims. 
Judge Jolly would have reversed outright, finding no evidence 
at all supporting plaintiffs' liberty theory of the case.89 It appeared 
to Judge Jolly "a manifest miscarriage of justice to require the de­
fendants to submit to a second trial of a claim in support of which 
the plaintiffs produced no evidence at the first trial."90 There is 
81. Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d at 256. 
82. Id. 
83. Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 676 {5th Cir. 1983) (citing S & S Consol. Rural 
High School Dist., 577 F.2d at 341) .  
84 .  Kaprelian v .  Texas Woman's Univ., 509 F.2d 133, 139  (5th Cir. 1975). 
85. Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d at 256 (footnote omitted). The remedy 
for a deprivation of liberty, it should be noted, is a name-clearing hearing before the gov­
erning body. White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 685 {5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 
(1982). It is not necessary that the hearing occur prior to publication of the stigmatizing 
charges. In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir. 1983). 
86. Wells v. Hico Indep. School Dist., 736 F.2d at 256 (citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 
624, 628 (1977)). 
87. 736 F.2d at 257. 
88. Id. at 258. 
89. Id. at 260 {Jolly, J., dissenting in part). 
90. Id. at 261. 
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much sense in Judge Jolly's thinking, but procedure is procedure. 
As seen in the majority's opinion, the defendants' failure to ques­
tion the sufficiency of the evidence at trial by a motion for directed 
verdict or motion for new trial foreclosed the point on appeal. 91 
In the words of Judge Gee's reversing opinion, Campos v. 
Guillot92 also involved a trial conducted under a " serious misap­
prehension of the law" as it relates to the liberty interest.93 After 
an investigation of alleged improper police surveillance by Chief of 
Police Campos for his own private purposes, the city council of 
Missouri City, Texas, asked for Campos' resignation. The city 
manager and council wanted to keep the matter private and did 
nothing to publicize their confidential findings. However, Chief 
Campos insisted on and was granted a public hearing. In due 
course, the Chiefs handling of his department was thrown open to 
public scrutiny. As a result, the council voted to fire him. 
Suit followed and the jury returned a verdict for the Chief, a 
verdict the appellate court swiftly set aside: "[n]owhere in the 
court's instructions to the jury is it advised that unless the stigma­
tizing matter is made public by the employer in connection with 
the discharge no 'name-clearing' proceeding is required. "9" There­
fore, the jury was left to believe that even unpublicized charges 
could give rise to a right to a name-clearing hearing. As Judge Gee 
concluded, " [t]hat is not the law."9� Without publication of the 
charges, Campos "accrued no right to a name-clearing proceed­
ing."96 Moreover, Campos' insistence to publicize the charges 
against him r emoved the activity from a protected procedural 
process. 
Only where the public employee is publicly defamed in con­
nection with his discharge is he entitled to an opportunity to re­
spond to the charges in public. Nothing of that sort occurred here, 
since Campos's employer strenuously· sought to prevent the 
charges against him from becoming public. "It thus appears that 
Mr. Campos himself, rather than the city, was the cause of 
whatever public airing the charge s  against him and his discharge 
91. Id. at 259 n.24 (majority opinion). 
92. 743 F.2d 1 123 (5th Cir. 1984). 
93. Id. at 1126. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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received."97 Because the trial court failed to charge the jury re­
garding the necessary " publication" element of a liberty abridg­
ment, the jury may well have returned a verdict against the de­
fendants "based on charges that they had sought to keep 
confidential and never published-until the plaintiff demanded it. 
This was reversible error. "98 
The reader may wonder what an employee is supposed to do 
to save his job in the face of false accusations strenuously kept 
secret by his governmental employer. Unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bishop v. Wood99 holds, perhaps wrongly, that 
"[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a 
guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions."100 
Such an employee is entitled to no name-clearing hearing, al­
though he "remains as free as before to seek another [job] . "1ol This 
may well strike an ordinary man as unfair, especially one who owes 
his daily bread to governmental employment. 
Three other cases involving public employees' substantive due 
process claims merit brief mention. Russell v. Harrison102 affirms a 
summary judgment against former university professors who sued 
when their contracts of employment were cancelled in mid-year for 
fiscal reasons. Although the professors' complaint was sufficient to 
state a constitutional claim, the defendant Board of Trustees' evi­
dence revealed a genuine financial emergency necessitating termi­
nation of the plaintiffs' contracts. The evidence showed that the 
dismissals were based " on an analysis of the most efficient staffing 
per full-time student" and "uniform criteria bearing a reasonable 
relationship to the universities' financial problem."103 These find­
ings satisfied the due process requirement. The court focused on 
the defendant Board's actions and determined that "at the least 
the actions were not arbitrary and capricious, or racially moti-
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). 
100. Id. at 350. For an egregious example of how Bishop v. Wood has been applied in 
the Fifth Circuit, see Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 
(1983) (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert.). For the au­
thor's reaction to Shawgo v. Spradlin, see Baier, Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional 
Law, 29 Lov. L. REV. 647, 669 (1983) ("But the net result in this case strikes me as perilously 
wrong."). 
101. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972). 
102. 736 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1984). 
103. Id. at 288. 
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vated."10• Since the professors faile d to adduce evidence showing 
the existence of a genuine issue of  material fact regarding the con­
stitutionality of their dismissal, summary judgment against them 
was proper. 
Everhart v. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 21011 reaf­
firms the Fifth Circuit's general unwillingness to involve itself in 
the internal affairs of public hospitals in the name of due process. 
The court upheld  a requirement that an applicant for admission to 
the medicat s taff of a public hospital must establish his "ability to 
work with others"106 to the satisfaction of the hospital's governing 
body. Accord ing to Judge Hill's opinion, the boar d 's consideration 
of Everhart's interpersonal relationships at the hospital was "rea­
sonably relate d to the provision of a dequate me d ical care ."107 As a 
result, the boar d's denial of staff membership to Everhart was 
"neither arbitrary nor capricious and did not deprive him of sub­
stantive due process. "108 The Fifth Circuit requires only that "the 
procedures employe d by the hospital are fair, that the stan dards 
set by the hospital are reasonable, and that they have been applied 
without arbitrariness and capriciousness."109 The court also re­
jected Everhart's claim that the potential effects of poor interper­
sonal relationships are not a matter of me dical expertise. While the 
character of a man is, in essence, a question of human nature, 
"when that character becomes embroiled in the confines of a hospi-
. tal environment, his character and his ability to work effectively in 
such an environment is a question uniquely suited to the hospital 
board."110 Lastly, given the court's " obvious lack of medical exper­
tise,"m the majority opinion demonstrated great deference to the 
governing board 's decision in the grant or denial of staff privileges. 
Finally, Hatton v. Wicks112 is  a hard case on its facts. How­
ever, the reviewing court was quite unwilling to rescue Ethel Hat­
ton from a firing for insubordination, although she had taught the 
sixth grade at the same school for ten years. In this case, the court 
104. Id. 
105. 757 F.2d 1567 (5th Cir. 1985). 
106. Id. at 1572. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1573 (citing Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp., 564 F.2d 1 159, 1162 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978)). 
110. 757 F.2d at 1573. 
111. Id. at 1572 (citing Laje, 564 F.2d at 1 1 62). 
112. 744 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1984) (summary calendar). 
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found that Mississippi law was not controlling: "Mississippi cannot 
by defining 'insubordination' or other grounds for discharge of 
teachers create or eliminate federal constitutional rights. The fed­
eral rights are independent of the state law."113 
No question was raised concerning the motive for Hatton's 
discharge. She was fired for twice failing to accept a "disciplinary 
problem" into her class when ordered to do so by the principal. 
Although the particular pupil was unruly, "he did not constitute 
such a serious problem that he could not attend regular school 
classes with other students."11" O n  these facts there was no viola­
tion of substantive due process. The principal had the right to 
make the challenged assignment; the teacher had no right to 
refuse. 
Judge Williams bends over backwards to explain that "a 
teacher who refuses to carry out her or his obligations in this man­
ner is 'interfering with the regular operation of the schools,' and is 
engaged in conduct which 'materially and substantially impedes 
the operation or effectiveness of the educational program.' "115 
Under these circumstances, Judge Williams concluded that the 
court would not interfere in the details of the school's administra­
tion; the majority found no constitutional violation in this case.116 
Moreover, there was neither "the slightest hint of racial, religious, 
or gender discrimination, [n]or interference with her free speech or 
other personal rights."117 One senses that Judge Williams' opinion 
is aimed directly at appellant; he seeks to explain the law to a 
sixth-grade teacher, not to a lawyer versed in substantive due pro­
cess, and to affirm only after a thorough public airing of the facts 
and the law. 
On the other hand, Judge Jolly would have affirmed Ethel 
Hatton's firing without troubling over an appellate opinion. In his 
special concurrence, he quipped that "to dwell on cases like this 
trivializes the truly important values and rights protected by the 
Constitution of the United States of America."118 "That federal 
courts should be made to second-guess everyday, mundane, ordi-
113. Id. at 503. 
114. Id. at 504. 
115. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968) and Brantley v. 
Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
116. 744 F.2d at 504. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. (Jolly, J., specially concurring). 
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nary, nonracial administrative decisions of the st�te school �ystem 
demonstrates how pandering to the common cavils o f  pubhc em­
ployees leads to the wasted time,  expense, and inconvenience of all 
parties."119 These are harsh words, bluntly expressed and sincer�ly 
believed. However, Judge Williams '  opinion, joined by Judge Hill, 
probably was aimed more at dispelling any lingering sense o� u.n­
fairness among the public school teachers of Columbus, Missis­
sippi, than at pandering to the cavils of one of their number. 
IV. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND PROCED URAL DUE 
PROCESS 
Judge Politz's prescient opi nion in Findeisen v .  North East 
Independent School District120 protects all tenured public school 
teachers in the Fifth Circuit from discharge without n otice of the 
reasons for the discharge and pre-termination opportunity to re­
spond. The opinion lays down important black letter law: "Where 
the property interest is the employment of a tenured public school 
teacher the teacher must be provided timely notice and an oppor­
tunity to answer charges so as to minimize the likelihood of an er­
roneous discharge. "12l The court carefully distinguishes Parratt v. 
Taylor122 which holds that post-deprivation state tort remedies are 
sufficient to generate "either the necessity of quick action by the 
State or the impracticability of providing any meaningful 
predeprivation process can . . .  satisfy the requirements of proce­
dural due process."123 Unlike Parratt, the present action 
affects Findeisen's professional standing and livelihood. The termi­
nation of a tenured public school teacher adversely impacts on the 
teacher's personal and professional standing in both the educational 
community and the greater societal community. Findeisen's claim is 
not for a few dollars worth of hobby goods which were negligently 
los�; it involves his career . . . .  [T]here was no necessity for hasty 
action; no emergency existed . . . .  [A]bsent the occasional emer-
gency, a school board can easily hold a meaningful predeprivation 
hearing to properly consider whether to discharge a tenured 
teacher .124 
119. Id. 
120. 749 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2657 ( 1 985). 
121. 749 F.2d at 239. 
122. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
i23. 749 F.2d at 238 (footnote omitted) (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539). 
124. 749 F.2d at 239. 
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In the context of discharge of a tenured public school teacher, the 
court perceived "no Parratt-directed change in the essential teach­
ings of Roth, Sindermann and their progeny."12& Now here,  cer­
tainly, is straight talk from the federal bench.128 It is always grati­
fying to read law that fits reality. 
On the other hand, Judge Garwood's concurring opinion in 
Findeisen questions why pre-termination process is constitution­
ally due when "wholly adequate and previously well established 
state procedures exist under which the School District's actions 
may be subsequently challenged 'de novo' and full recovery had for 
any economic loss."127 As Judge Garwood sees it, "[t]hat protection 
of this special, predeprivation kind is constitutionally required 
across the board for all state employees with any type of tenure or 
employment contract seems unrealistic and not in keeping with 
our traditional expectations and understandings. "128 Nevertheless, 
Judge Garwood agrees with the majorit y ,  noting that "[t]hese 
anomalies, however, appear sufficiently enmeshed in the current 
tangled web of the jurisprudence on this subject as to be b eyond 
attempted amelioration by a panel of this Court."129 
It is to Judge Politz's credit that the tangled web is n o  m ore. 
Less than two months after Findeisen was handed down, the Su­
preme Court, in Cle veland Boar d of Education v. Loudermill, iso 
reached the same result and used the same reasoning found in the 
carefully drafted opinion by Judge Politz. The parallels in thinking 
are striking. According to Justice White, "[t]he need for some form 
of pretermination hearing . . . is evident from a balancing of the 
competing interests at stake. "131 Reflecting the thinking of our Cir-
125. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and 
Perry v. Sincermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). 
126. Judge Wisdom's companion opinions in Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 
1984) and Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984) are also perceptive judicial 
canvasses that distinguish Parratt v. Taylor and hold it inapplicable "if the plaintiff alleges 
a violation of a substantive right protected by the Constitution against infringement by 
state governments." Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d at 327. And in the context of procedural due 
process, "Parratt applies only when the nature of the challenged conduct is such that the 
provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards is impracticable or infeasible." Id. at 329. 
In other words, "Parratt v. Taylor is not a magic wand that can make any section 1983 
action resembling a tort suit disappear into thin air," said Judge Wisdom, another straight­
shooter from the bench. Id. 
127. 749 F.2d at 240 (Garwood, J., concurring). 
128. Id. at 240-41 (footnote omitted). 
129. Id. at 241. 
130. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985). 
131. Id. at 1494. 
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cuit Justice and Judge Politz, the C ourt held that "the significance 
of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gain 
said."132 Furthermore, the Court found that an opportunity for the 
employee to respond to an imminent discharge is essential to an 
accurate court decision. 133 B oth Justice White and Judge Politz 
agreed that neither a governmental interest in immediate termina­
tion nor an administrative burden or delay would outweigh the in­
terest in affording an employee a predetermination hearing. 134 
Thus, it is now the sensible law of the Constitution that all 
tenured public employees are vested with a property right in con­
tinued employment. According to Loudermill, 
[t]he opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, 
why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due pro­
cess requirement. The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or 
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the em­
ployer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the 
story.135 
Notice that this gives a public employee a chance to save his job 
before he is let go; he is entitled t o  present his side of the story 
before the axe falls. The rationale behind this protecti on is the be­
lief that talk between an employee and his public employer may 
dispel differences between them, saving a job now and then. 
Before noting a few technical pointers touching procedural 
due process and public employment, it is worth observing that the 
same Dr. Davis who lost his free speech verdict to Judges Hill, 
Rubin, and Tate in Davis v. West Community Hospita/136 suc­
ceeded in convincing the panel to affirm on due process grounds. 
As a result, the decision reinstated Dr. Davis to the medical staff 
and upheld a $10,000 jury verdict for due process damages. 
Turning to the technical points of the case, first, because there 
existed a factual dispute as to the sufficiency of the hearing proce­
dures resulting in Davis's suspension, "the due process issue was 
properly presented to the jury."137 In other words, lawyers who try 
these due process cases for plaintiffs would do well to probe the 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1495. 
135. Id. at 1495 (citation omitted). 
136. 755 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra note 6 3  and accompanyin g  text. 
137. 755 F.2d at 464. 
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decision making of their opponent. For example, in this case, the 
hospital board allowed Dr. Davis to present evidence during the 
suspension hearings. However, it appears that the actual decision­
making body did not consider such evidence in its final determina­
tion. Thus, it is to counsel's credit that he unearthed such damning 
data during the discovery phase. One never knows what one will 
find by deep digging into the enemy's files. 
Second, even though Dr. Davis suffered .no resulting loss of in­
come-indeed he earned more money at other hospitals-he still 
took $10,000 in due process "actual damages."138 Just what these 
actual damages are is not self-evident, although there is talk in an­
other case of "damages for mental or emotional distress fiowing 
from the loss of [plaintiff's] procedural rights ."139 Denial of due 
process, it seems, can be a costly thing. 
Ad Damnum 
Related to the issue o f  damages is the back pay principle of 
Wheeler v .  Mental Health and Mental Retardation Authority.140 
Ms. Wheeler was lawfully terminated on September 27 for stealing 
Tranxene, a drug, from her workplace. Judge Jolly quite properly 
held Wheeler was unconstitutionally fired on August 4 because her 
initial discharge did not meet the stringent demands of due pro­
cess. Interestingly enough, all this procedural deficiency was later 
cured by a procedurally flawless hearing on September 27. The 
question then became whether Ms. Wheeler should take back pay 
from August 4 to September 27. The court held on this issue as 
follows: 
If, however, the defendants fail to prove that Wheeler would have 
been dismissed on August 4 absent procedural defects, Wheeler will 
be entitled to back pay from August 4 until September 27. In that 
case, the procedural due process violation could properly be viewed 
as the cause of the initial discharge and the award of back pay 
would constitute compensation to Wheeler rather than a windfall. ui 
The justice of the Wheeler rule is likely to escape lay perception ,  
138. Id. at 468. 
139. Wheeler v. Mental Health & Mental Retardation Auth., 752 F.2d 1063, 1072 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original). "Those damages, however, must be proved; they will not 
be presumed." Id. (citing Russell v. Harrison, 736 F.2d 283, 291 n.17 (5th Cir. 1984); Carey 
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978)). 
140. Wheeler, 752 F.2d 1063. 
141. Id. at 1071-72. 
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although most assuredly it is a sound prophylactic against sloppy 
discharges. The court emphasizes that even absent a denial of lib­
erty or of property, "the right to procedural due process is 'abso­
lute' in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a 
claimant's s ubstantive assertions, and because of the importance to 
organized society that procedural due process be observed. "142 
As mentioned earlier, Wheeler may recover damages for 
"mental or emotional distress flowing from the loss of her proce­
dural rights,"143 regardless of defendants' success in proving an 
August 4 discharge absent procedural defects. However, these 
damages must be proved; they w ill not be presumed. 144 Another 
panel of Fifth Circuit judges confronting the same kind of problem 
opined that " [ w]here no substantive violation of rights can be 
shown, it is difficult to envision what actual damages plaintiff 
might prove. "1.a The Fifth Circuit has expressed skepticism as to 
whether actual damages resulting solely from denial of due process 
ever can be proven, although our circuit has afforded plaintiffs an 
opportunity to prove such damages. 146 
V. HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE SCHOOLS 
The ruling of the Fifth C ircuit in Gay Student Services v.  
Texas A & M University147 requires Texas A & M to recognize a 
gay student group notwithstanding the Board of Regents' solemn 
declaration that 
[s]o-called "gay" activities run diabolically [sic-diametrically?] 
counter to the traditions and standards of Texas A & M University, 
and the Board of Regents is determined to defend the suit filed 
against it by three students seeking "gay" recognition and, if neces­
sary, to proceed in every legal way to prohibit any group with such 
goals from organizing or operating on this or any other campus for 
which this Board is responsible. 148 
The Regents lost. 
142. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 266, quoted in Russell, 736 F.2d at 291 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
143. 752 F.2d at 1072 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
144. Id. 
145. Russell, 736 F.2d at 291 n.17. 
146. See Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021, 1032 (5th Cir. 1981). 
147. 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1860 (1985). 
148. 737 F.2d at 1322 (correction suggested by the Fifth Circuit). 
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Within three days of this decision, in Naragon v. �Vharton,149 
the Fifth Circuit held that Louisiana State University could legally 
remove Kristine Naragon, an avowed lesbian, from her classroom 
in Baton Rouge. 
What follow are a few comments that seek to expose inconsis­
tencies in the law of colleges and courts as it has evolved over the 
past seventy years. Consi deration of these two cases in tandem 
sharpens the legal mind and uncovers troublesome issues of law 
and fact lurking beneath the surface of what the judges tell us i n  
their opinions. 
A. Background 
First we must go back in time some �eventy years to Oxford, 
Mississippi, to the days of Chancellor Kincannon's administration 
at the University of Mississippi. According to local history, "the 
troublesome issue of the anti-fraternity agitation"160 occupied ev­
eryone's mind in those early days. It seems a fell ow named Lee 
Russell was snubbed by one of the Greek fraternities on campus; 
he never forgot nor forgave the snubbing. Later, Lee became Gov­
ernor Russell, a keen supporter of a bill in the Mississippi Legisla­
ture outlawing Greek-letter fraternities on the campus of Ole Miss. 
The following account of the struggle suggests the flavor of the 
fight: 
Lee M. Russell, who as a student led the fight against the fraterni­
ties, was now active in state politics and once more led the fight. 
The matter was discussed favorably and unfavorably in the public 
press and ultimately reached the floor of the state legislature. Some 
of the arguments used to discredit the Greek-letter societies were 
that they encouraged dissipation, they led to waste of money, that 
they discouraged study and scholarship, that they interfered with 
the work of the literary societies, that they destroyed "college spirit" 
by fostering cliques. But the crowning criticism was that they had 
been the cause of social ostracism of the non-fraternity students by 
the people of Oxford. Whether these charges were true or not, the 
legislature saw fit in 1912 to prohibit secret societies in the state's 
schools by passing a law which remained on the statute books for 
fourteen years. m 
149. 737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984). . 
150. A CABANISS, THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI: ITS FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 126 (2d 
ed. 1971). 
151. Id. at 127. Today, of course, the campus at Ole Miss is full of fraternities: "Be-
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Now, as far as lawyers are c oncerned, the next stop is to as� 
whether such a college regulation would hold up in court. Ind�ed it 
did, despite a Kappa Sigma's argument that the statute abrid
.
ged 
the fourteenth amendment because it " 'without r eason deprives 
the complainant of his property and property right, libert� and his 
harmless pursuit of happiness, and denies to the complainant the 
equal protection of the law of the state of Mississip p i . ' "162 
Notice this says nothing about freedom to asso c iate, and yet 
the allegations come close to those in the Gay Student Services 
case, as we shall see in a moment. Further, note that the Oxford, 
Mississippi, fraternity boys of 1912 claimed only the "harmless 
pursuit of happiness." Whether an association of homosexual stu­
dents at C ollege Station, Texas, is similarly harmless today is a 
point over which colleges and courts have sharply divided. Cer­
tainly these cases of "Greeks" and "Gays"163 offer an intriguing 
comparison. 
The Oxford charge was accentuated "by the allegation that 
the society of which the complainant [was] a member 'has for its 
paramount purpose the promotion and enforcement of good 
morals, the highest possible attainment and standing in the clas­
ses, and good order and discipline in the student bodies of the dif­
ferent colleges with which it is c onnected.' "1114 Here is how Justice 
Joseph McKenna, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court in­
cluding such minds as Oliver Wendell Holmes and Charles Evans 
Hughes, responded in Waugh v. Board of Trustees. 166 Although 
well-nigh forgotten, this case still remains controlling authority: 
It is said that the fraternity to which complainant belongs is a 
moral and of itself a disciplinary force. This need not be denied. But 
whether such membership makes against discipline was for the state 
of Mississippi to determine. It is to be remembered that the Univer­
sity was established by the state, and is under the control of the 
cause University of Mississippi students have had to fight for their fraternities, they idealize 
them." Id. at 188 n.49. Upon inquiry, ex rel. Morris Marx, Vice Chancellor for Academic 
Affairs, the University of Mississippi, Jan. 22,  1986, the writer learned that no gay students 
group has demanded recognition from the authorities at Ole Miss, not to date at least, al­
though the law of the Fifth Circuit binds Mississippi as well as Texas. 
152. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589, 593 (1915). 
153. "I shall, in most cases, use the term 'gay' to describe both men and women whose 
sexual orientation is toward persons of the same sex. Gay is the preferred word." Rivera. 
Queer• Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 
459, 463 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Rivera]. 
154. Waugh, 237 U.S. at 593. 
155. 237 U.S. 589. 
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state, and the enactment of the statute may have been induced by 
the opinion that membership in the prohibited societies divided the 
attention of the students, and distracted from that singleness of 
purpose which the state desired to exist in its public educational 
institutions. It is not for us to entertain conjectures in opposition to 
the views of the state, and annul its regulations upon disputable 
considerations of their wisdom or necessity.166 
So far as I can tell, the Fifth Circuit has followed Waugh only 
once, citing it in support of a rule requiring haircuts in the public 
schools. 1117 
B. Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University 
Judges Brown, Reavley, and Williams quite boldly held clearly 
erroneous the district court's finding of fact that Gay Student Ser­
vices is just like a Greek fraternity subject to Texas A & M's tradi­
tional ban on fraternal organizations on campus.1118 For over 100 
years, Texas A & M has chosen not to include Greek fraternities 
and sororities as an official part of its educational program. As the 
administration explained, "[t]he University has supported the pre­
mise that its social character was developed in the concept of to­
getherness in that all students were Aggies and that a social caste 
system would detract from this most important concept which 
welded together the students that attended Texas A & M."H9 
Without questioning Texas A & M's exclusion of Greeks from 
its educational program-an exclusion legally linked to 
Waugh-the appellate court did state that the district· court's 
156. Id. at 596-97. 
157. Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 393 
U.S. 856 (1968). For the end of the hair story in the Fifth Circuit, see the 8 to 7 en bane 
split in Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972) (likewise 
upholding hair cuts in the public schools). In his dissent, Judge Wisdom pointed his finger 
at Justice Black, whose views carried majority weight in the Fifth Circuit: 
The Court apparently takes its cue from the late Mr. Justice Black's suggestion that 
the only "serious" aspect of a "long hair case" is "the idea that anyone should think 
the Federal Constitution imposes on the United States courts the burden of supervis­
ing the length of hair that public school students should wear." 
460 F.2d at 619 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Certiorari was denied by the Supreme court. 
158. "[W]e conclude that the District Court's factual findings with regard to the 
nature of GSS were clearly erroneous. We think it clear from the facts that T AMU 
refused officially to recognize GSS based upon the homosexual content of the group's 
ideas-which it sought to convey through implementing its stated goals and 
purposes." 
Gay Student Servs., 737 F.2d at 1324. 
159. Id. at 1321-22. 
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analogizing Gay Student Services (GSS) to Greek frat
_
ernities is 
"utterly at o dds with the asserted purposes of GSS ,  which soug.ht recognition to provide services and information regarding gay is­
sues to gay persons and to the general public. "1 60 What GSS 
wB.nted to do was to provide the Texas A & M community with 
"information concerning the structures and realities  of gay life" 
and to "provide a forum for the interchange of ideas and construc­
tive solutions to gay people's problems. "181 Surely these goals sur­
pass mere socializing. Furthermore, the University's asserted rea­
sons for denying recognition were based on the belief "that the 
organization would attempt to convey ideas about homosexual­
ity."182 In short, the refusal to recognize the group was clearly "tied 
to the homosexual nature of the group. "183 For this reason, the de­
fense did not center on the fraternal nature of the GSS. Instead, as 
Judge Brown tells us in his opinion, " [t]he evidence presented at 
trial consisted almost solely of medical testimony from specialists 
in human sexuality regarding the effect the presence of a homosex­
ual student group might have o n  a university campus. "164 
Plainly, the panel was correct to reject the facile equation of 
Gay Student Services to Sigma Phi Epsilon. As for the law, Judge 
Brown explained that the Supreme Court's standards enunciated 
in Healy v. James16r. are controlling: The reader will recall that 
Healy reversed and remanded a denial of college recognition to a 
local student chapter of Students for a Democratic Society. Healy 
rests upon the first amendment " right of individuals to associate to 
further their personal beliefs. "166 The rationale of the holding is 
that " [t]here can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, 
without justification, to college o rganizations burdens or abridges 
that associational right. "167 
Of course, one crucial step beyond "questions of affiliation and 
philosophy"168 lie questions directed at SDS's activ i ties not its 
philosophy. In other words, advocacy of ideas is one thi�g; advo-
160. Id. at 1322. 
161. Id. at 1320. 
162. Id. at 1322 (emphasis in original). 
163. Id. (footnote omitted). 
164. Id. at 1321. 
165. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
166. Id. at 181. 
167. Id. (emphasis added). 
168. Id. at 188. 
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cacy of "imminent lawless action"169 is quite another. But the rec­
ord in Healy as recited by the Supreme Court disclosed "no sub­
stantial basis"170 for the University's fear that recognition of the 
local chapter of SDS would pose a threat of imminent lawless ac­
tion or of "actions which 'materially and substantially disrupt the 
work and discipline of the school. ' "171 Denial o f  recognition on this 
unsubstantiated factual basis was therefore unconstitutional. 172 
By parity of reasoning, our circuit court rejects the claim that 
recognition of Gay Student Services at College Station would likely 
"incite, promote, and result"173 in homosexual acts. The court 
added that there exists evidence neither that any illegal activity 
has occurred as a result of  GSS's existence in the past, nor that 
proscribed homosexual activity will result from this organization in 
the future. The court emphasized that "while Texas law may pro­
hibit certain homosexual practices, no Texas law makes it a crime 
to be a homosexual."17" Consistent with Healy, our circuit judges 
could not conclude that the " 'critical line . . .  between advocacy 
and action' has been violated in this case."176 
At trial, Texas A & M also asserted that "recognition of GSS 
would encourage more homosexual conduct, resulting in an in­
crease in the number of persons with the psychological and physio­
logical problems TAMU's experts claimed were more prevalent 
among homosexuals than among heterosexuals. "176 Moreover, the 
University asserted that denial of recognition was justifiable as an 
appropriate measure in protecting public health. Whether this is 
true or not seems to be a medical question upon which experts 
differ. However, the district court did say that " [t]he Court finds 
the testimony that male homosexuals pose a significant public 
169. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). 
"[T]he critical line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between advocacy, which 
is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not." Healy, 408 U.S. at 192. 
170. Healy, 408 U.S. at 190. 
171. Id. at 189. The test of "material and substantial" disruption originated in the law 
of the Fifth Circuit, see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966), and was picked 
up by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community School Dist. , 393 U.S. 
503, 509, 513 (1969) and carried over into Healy, 408 U.S. at 189. 
172. 408 U.S. at 191. "[l]nsofar as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it consti­
tuted little more than the sort of 'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance 
[which] is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.' " Id. (quoting Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 508). 
173. 737 F.2d at 1328. 
174. Id. (emphasis in original).  
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 1330. 
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health problem because they h ave greater incidence of venereal 
disease to be credible."177 
Our appellate court was not impressed: 
This asserted [health] justification must fail for the same rea­
sons the others did: TAMU has simply not proven that recognition 
will indeed imminently result in such dire consequences. The specu­
lative evidence offered by the defendants' experts " for which no his­
torical or empirical basis is disclosed," cannot justify T AMU's con­
tent-based refusal to recognize GSS. 178 
The reference to speculative medical testimony "for which no his­
torical or empirical basis is disclosed" is a borrowed phrase from 
an Eighth Circuit decision, Gay Lib v. University of Missouri.119 In 
this case, a divided panel of judges held that the University's re­
fusal to recognize Gay Lib as a campus organization denied plain­
tiffs their first amendment rights. The First and Fourth Circuits 
have reached the same conclusion. 1 80 The Eighth Circuit's Gay Lib 
opinion drops a cautionary footno te that may strike the reader as 
strange: "[R]ecognition of Gay Lib is not determinative of whether 
its members will be allowed to meet or associate, but only of 
whether the group may use school facilities and become eligible for 
student activities funds."181 Judge Brown's opinion for our Fifth 
Circuit certainly suggests that formal recognition carries with it a 
177. Id. at 1328 n.17. 
178. Id. at 1330. 
179. 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978). 
180. Gay Alliance of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1976); Gay Students 
Org. of the Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). In the former case, Chief 
Judge Markey of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation, pointed 
out in his concurring opinion that these cases show "the futility of the association-register­
ing process at state-supported institutions of higher education." 544 F.2d at 167 (Markey, 
C.J., concurring). Judge Markey continued: "Thus, associations devoted to peaceful advo­
cacy of decriminalization or social acceptance of sadism, euthanasia, masochism, murder, 
genocide, segregation, master-race theories, gambling, voodoo, and the abolishment of all 
higher education, to list a few, must be granted registration . . . .  " Id. Recognition is re­
quired by the first amendment, according to Judge Markey, notwithstanding the imprima­
tur effect: 
That registration and recognition of an organization do not imply approval of 
its aims is, in my view, a fiction. The impression that the aims of registered and 
recognized associations are at least unobjectionable to university authorities is, of 
course, one of the reasons plaintiff seeks registration and is the fundamental rationale 
of defendants in refusing it. I think it clear that registration and recognition confer a 
status not enjoyed by unregistered and unrecognized associations. 
Id. at 168. 
181. 558 F.2d at 854 n.11.  
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right to meet on campus. 182 
669 
It is worth noting that Justice Holmes would not have ap­
proved our circuit's applying the law of "clear and present danger" 
to the situation of Gay Student Services at College Station.183 And 
most assuredly, Holmes as a judge would not so freely discount the 
competing views of medical experts on the homosexual question. 
Based on Judge Brown's own recitation of the expert medical testi­
mony in the Gay Student Services case-testimony which the dis­
trict court found "credible"-one might conclude that the Regents' 
argument was not without substance. A close reading of the opin­
ion yields the acknowledgment that " [ t ]he defense in particular 
centered on statistics and opinions documenting increased crime 
rates and severe emotional problems found within the homosexual 
community."184 This evidence is arguably more than mere specula­
tion " 'for which no historical or empirical basis is disclosed. ' "185 
With all due respect, it is unlikely that the record is as naked as 
the panel describes it to be. Such is the danger of borrowing a neat 
phrase from the law of the Eighth Circuit and applying it to a 
Fifth Circuit record. 
The dissenting judge along with an evenly d ivided court in the 
Missouri Gay Lib case also thought that the University's expert 
medical testimony was neither "skimpy [nor] speculative."188 Here 
182. One of the advantages of official recognition, as pointed out by Judge Brown, is 
"[a]uthorization to hold meetings and functions on campus," together with "free use of uni­
versity meeting rooms and facilities." 737 F.2d at 1319 n.3. 
183. "It does an ill-service to the author of the most quoted judicial phrases regarding 
freedom of speech, to make him the victim of a tendency which he fought all his life, 
whereby phrases are made to do service for critical analysis by being turned into dogma." 
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 352 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "It is one of 
t�e misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long 
tune cease to provoke further analysis." Holmes, J., dissenting, in Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912). " 'Clear and present danger' was never used by Mr. Justice Holmes 
� express a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases. It was a 
literary phrase not to be distorted by being taken from its context." Pennekamp, 328 U.S. 
at 352-53 (1946) (Frankfurter, J. ,  concurring). 
A little later, the Supreme Court repeated the point that "neither Justice Holmes nor 
Justice Brandeis ever envisioned that a shorthand phrase should be crystallized into a rigid rut� to be applied inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of each case." Dennis v.  
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951). There are plenty of cases in the Fifth Circuit that 
recognize the supremacy of context over catch phrase. See, e.g. , Blackwell v. Issaquena 
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
184. 737 F.2d at 1321. 
185. Id. at 1330 (quoting Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 ( 1978)). 
186. Gay Lib, 558 F.2d at 858 (Regan, J., dissenting) (brackets in the original). 
670 Loyola Law Review 
[ Vol. 31:639 
is what Chief Judge Gibson had to say: "Lacking training in the 
psychiatric discipline, appellate judges are ill-pr�par�d to concl�d.
e 
that these expert psychiatric opinions lack an h1sto�1cal or e�pm� 
cal basis."187 Justice Rehnquist's d issent from a denial of cert10rari 
in the Gay Lib case also demonstrates a sharp split among judges 
addressing the issues central to this dispute. 
Expert psychological testimony below established the fact that the 
meeting together of individuals who consider themselves homosex­
ual in an officially recognized university organization can have a dis­
tinctly different effect from the mere advocacy of repeal of the 
State's sodomy statute. As the University has recognized, this dan­
ger may be particularly acute in the university setting where many 
students are still coping with the sexual problems which accompany 
late adolescence and early adulthood.188 
Whether the reader agrees with Justice Rehnquist, or with 
Judge Brown for that matter, is not my concern here. I focus only 
on the exposure of competing views, although I will venture to say 
that whatever else one thinks o f  the jurisprudence of William 
Rehnquist, there can be no doubt that he has a stinging legal 
mind. Here is how Rehnquist the lawyer analyzes the Gay Lib's 
demand for campus recognition: 
From the point of view of the [Gay Lib ] ,  the question is little differ­
ent from whether university recognition of a college Democratic club 
in fairness also requires recognition of a college Republican club. 
From the point of view of the University, however, the question is 
more akin to whether those suffering from measles have a constitu­
tional right, in violation of quarantine regulations, to associate to­
gether and with others who do not presently have measles, in order 
to urge repeal of a state law providing that measle sufferers be quar­
antined. The very act of assemblage under these circumstances un­
dercuts a significant interest of the State which a plea for the repeal 
of the law would in no wise do. Where between these two polar char­
acterizations of the issue the truth lies is not as important as 
whether a federal appellate court i s  free to reject the University's 
characterization, particularly when i t  is supported by the findings of 
the District Court. 189 
187. 558 F.2d at 860 (Gibson, C.J., joined by Henley, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en bane). 
188. 434 U.S. 1080, 1083 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) .  
189. Id. at 1084. 
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As I have said, the district court in the Gay Student Services 
case found Texas A & M's expert medical testimony "credible." 
Yet on appeal, the panel rushes to its own independent judgment 
on the facts and the law, quite contrary to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a) and to the confining strictures of Pullman-Stan­
dard u. Swint.190 Again the Supreme Court has recently reminded 
us that "[t]his standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court 
to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is con­
vinced that it would have decided the case differently."191 Justice 
White writing for the majority further added that " [t]he reviewing 
court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52 if it under­
takes to duplicate the role of the lower court."192 
But quite apart from this procedural nicety, the latest devel­
opments of substance suggest that we have not heard the last word 
on the homosexual question, including the first amendment claim 
of gay students and teachers who want to assemble and talk in the 
public schools. The Supreme Court has called upward the Elev­
enth Circuit's ruling in Hardwick v. Bowers193 to determine 
whether Georgia's sodomy statute is unconstitutional. Judge 
Reavley's en bane opinion in Baker v. Wade194 holds quite the con­
trary in the Fifth Circuit where sodomy remains a crime in Dallas. 
Doubtless, Judge Reavley knows that Baker v. Wade is no immi­
nent threat to the Gay Student Services opinion which he joined. 
Sodomy is one thing, talk is another. Yet as last Term's four-to­
four split in the National Gay Task Force196 case shows, the dis­
tinction between advocacy and action in the context of homosexu­
ality in the public schools is not as clear a guide to judicial judg­
ment as might first appear on the surface of legal analysis. 
There is afoot among judges the rival view that, although the 
first amendment protects political expression and association, 
[t]he advocacy of a practice as universally condemned as the crime 
of sodomy hardly qualifies as such. There is no need to establish 
that such advocacy will interfere, substantially or otherwise, in nor­
mal school activities. It is sufficient that such advocacy is advanced 
190. 456 U.S. 273 (1982). 
191. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 105 S .  Ct. 1 504, 1511 (1985). 
192. Id. 
193. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 
S. Ct. 342 (1985). 
194. 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane). 
195. Board of Educ., Okla. v. National Gay Task Force, 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985), aff'g 
per curiam by an equally divided court, 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984). 
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in a manner that creates a substan tial risk that such conduct will 
encourage scho o l  children to commit the a bominable 
_
crime against 
nature. This finds solid support in Tinker [v. Des Moines Indepen­
dent Community School District] ,  where the Court said "First 
Amendment rights must always be app lied 'in light of the special 
characteristics of the . . .  environment' in the particular case. "196 
Four current Supreme Court justices apparently agree with this 
view.197 
Incidentally, the judge who first brought the Waugh fraternity 
boys case to my attention was Mr. Justice Black, a fierce def ender 
of first amendment freedoms. For Justice Black, Waugh was a first 
amendment case, just as Gay Student Services is a first amend­
ment case. In his dissent in Tinker, Justice Black recalled that 
" [t]he State had [in Waugh] passed a law barring students from 
peaceably assembling in Greek letter fraternities and providing 
that students who joined them could be expelled from school. This 
law would appear on the surface to run afoul of the First Amend­
ment's freedom of assembly clause. "198 Yet as those familiar with 
Justice Black's opinions know, the Judge sided with the school offi­
cials, not the students, in the Tinker black armband school case.199 
Here is how Elizabeth Black, who was sitting in the wives' section 
at Court, describes the moment in her diary: 
Monday, February 24, 1969 Abe Fortas delivered the 
opinion in the Tinker Mourning Band School case and Hug o, as the 
television said, delivered a blistering dissent. His dissent, so said the 
paper , was twenty-five minutes long. I was on the edge of my chair , 
hands and fee t  like ice, and the brethren in various stages of 
shock.200 
196. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1277 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting in part Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
197. 105 S. Ct. 1858 (1985), where the Court's enigmatic silence on this issue is pre­
served in its per curiam decision. An affirmance by an equally divided Court without an 
opinion, of course, leaves the reader guessing as to the competing judicial views. "Legal 
scuttlebutt has Stevens, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan affirming the decision and Bur­
ger, O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist dissenting . . . . Both gay advocates and the 
?�Iahoma City Board of Education publically claimed victory. However, most gay rights 
litigators breathed a sigh of relief that another decision survived the Supreme Court." Ri­
vera, supra note 153, at 533 (footnote omitted). 
198. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522·23 (Black, J., dissenting). 
199. Id. at 526. 
200. H.L. BLACK & E. BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: The Memoirs of Hugo L Black and Elizabeth Black 217 (P.R. Baier ed. 1986). 
. 
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In no uncertain terms, Justice Black reminded his Tinker listeners 
of the "complete relevan[ce of Waugh's reasoning] for us today":201 
[T]he enactment of the statute may have been induced by the 
opinion that membership in the prohibited societies divided the at­
tention of the students and distracted from that singleness of pur­
pose which the State desired to exist in its public educational in­
stitutions. It is not for us to entertain conjectures in opposition to 
the views of the State and annul its regulations upon disputable 
considerations of their wisdom or necessity.202 
Based upon this argument, Justice Black relates that the Waugh 
Court upheld "the power of Mississippi to curtail the First Amend­
ment's right of peaceable assembly."203 
A little later a schoolboy sued in federal court challenging a 
rule requiring schoolboys' hair not to hang over their ears. Again 
Justice Black sided with the school principal, not the sixteen-year­
old.204 And when the Supreme Court was urged to recognize the 
disease of chronic alcoholism as a defense to drunkenness in the 
street (or on campus), Justice Black refused "to plunge . . .  into 
the murky problems raised by the insistence that chronic al­
coholics cannot be punished for public drunkenness, problems that 
no person, whether layman or expert, can claim to understand, and 
with consequences that no one can safely predict. "205 
C. Naragon v. Wharton 
The question of homosexual teachers in the classroom, espe-
201. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 523 (Black, J., dissenting). 
202. Id. (quoting Waugh, 237 U.S. at 596-97) (emphasis added by Black). 
203. 393 U.S. at 523 (Black, J., dissenting). 
204. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1202-03 (1971) (Chambers Opinion, Black, J.) 
(denial of a motion to vacate a stay of injunction pending appeal): 
The motion in this case is presented to me in a record of more than 50 pages, 
not counting a number of exhibits. The words used throughout the record such as 
"Emergency Motion" and "harassment" and "irreparable damages" are calculated to 
leave the impression that this case over the length of hair has created or is about to 
create a great national "crisis." I confess my inability to understand how anyone 
would thus classify this hair length case. The only thing about it that borders on the 
serious to me is the idea that anyone should think the Federal Constitution imposes 
on the United States courts the burden of supervising the length of hair that public 
school students should wear. 
A majority of the Fifth Circuit agreed with Justice Black. See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 
(5th Cir. 1972) (en bane), discussed in note 157 supra. 
205. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (Black, J., joined by Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
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cially in the primary and secondary grades, has "swirled nation­
wide for many years. "206 Whether teachers-male or female-may 
lawfully be expelled from the classroom merely because they are 
gay depends on the educational level in question and o n  the law of 
the forum state. In one high school case an English teacher named 
Gish was ordered to undergo a psychiatric examination after he 
assumed the presidency of the New Jersey Gay Activists Alli­
ance.207 School officials claimed Gish's actions displayed "deviation 
from normal mental health which may affect his ability to teach, 
discipline and associate with the students. "208 
The appellate court affirmed: "A teacher works i n  a sensitive 
area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds 
toward the society in which they live,"209 said the New Jersey 
judges, borrowing from Mr. Justice Minton's opinion in Adler v. 
Board of Education.210 Moreover, " [t] hat the school authorities 
have the right and duty to screen the officials, teachers, and em­
ployees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity o f  the schools 
as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted. "21 1 Off to the psy­
chiatrist went Mr. Gish. Candor compels me to say that this was 
1976, before the "celebration"212 of gay rights in this country, and 
Adler, of course, was a case involving the purge of Communists, 
not homosexuals, from the classroom. 213 
In the Morrison214 case, the California Supreme Court rejected 
the view, found in some decisions, that homosexuality equals unfit­
ness to teach: "The private conduct of a man, who is also a 
206. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 
1373, 1375 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(quoting Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 730 F.2d 
444, 453 (6th Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., dissenting)).  
207. Gish v. Board of Educ., 145 N.J. Super. 96, 366 A.2d 1337 (App. Div. 1976), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). 
208. 366 A.2d at 1341-42. 
209. Id. at 1342 (quoting Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 ( 1 951)). 
210. 342. U.S. 485 (1952). 
211. 366 A.2d at 1342 (quoting Adler, 342 U.S. at 493). 
212. "Though homosexuals are not 'celebrating' in the United States it remains the 
case that, in the judgment of many, homosexuality is the worst fate tha; could befall a 
person." Slovenko, Foreword: The Homosexual and Society: A Historical Perspective, 10 U. 
DAYTON L. REV. 445, 456-57 (1985). 
213. This is not to say, however, that the hysteria of the '50's did not touch homosexu­
als: "In 1950 the senate produced a report on the Employment of Homosexuals and Other 
Sex Perverts in Government." Slovenko, supra note 212, at 448. 
(l96::
4. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3 d  214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 
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teacher, is a proper concern to those who employ him only to the 
extent it mars him as a teacher,"2u said Justice Tobriner in an 
opinion heralded as a landmark by gay rights enthusiasts. " 'Where 
[a teacher's] professional achievement is unaffected, where the 
school community is placed in no jeopardy, his private acts are his 
own business and may not be the basis of discipline. ' "216 By way of 
contrast, the law in Washington State is less liberal. There, a ho­
mosexual high school teacher named Gaylord was held lawfully 
fired upon findings that 
[a]fter Gaylord's homosexual status became publicly known, it 
would and did impair his teaching efficiency. A teacher's efficiency is 
determined by his relationship with his students, their parents, the 
school administration and fellow teachers. If Gaylord had not been 
discharged after he became known as a homosexual, the result 
would be fear, confusion, suspicion, parental concern and pressure 
on the administration by students, parents and other teachers.217 
Undoubtedly, Professor Rivera is right to say, in her encyclopedic 
series of articles,218 that " [e]mployment of gay persons as teachers 
in elementary schools and high schools is still a very controversial 
issue."219 
As far as I can determine, experts seem to be divided on the 
question of the effect of a known homosexual on elementary and 
secondary students, and the reported decisions reflect this battle. 
One federal district court, after thoroughly rehearsing the conflict­
ing expert testimony, did state that "instruction of an eighth-grade 
earth science class by a known homosexual poses sensitive 
problems, both for relationships among students and between stu­
dents and parents. "220 To date, the Supreme Court has cautiously 
avoided getting caught in this swirl, most recently by denying cer-
215. 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (quoting Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake 
City School Dist., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143, 146 (C.P. 1967)). 
216. 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182. 
217. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340, 1342 (en 
bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). 
218. Rivera, supra note 153, at 459. Professor Rivera's asterisk following the word 
"Queer*" directs us to the dictionary: *"1. Deviating from the expected or normal; strange. 
2. Odd or unconventional in behavior; eccentric. 3. Arrousing suspicion. 4. Slang. Homosex­
ual." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGAUGE 1070 (W. Morris ed. 
1976). See also Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Per­
sons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979). 
219. Rivera, supra note 153, at 514. 
220. Acanfora v. Board of Educ., Montgomery County, 359 F. Supp. 843, 849 (D. Md. 
1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). 
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tiorari in Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. J 0,221 and by re­
fusing to review the Sixth Circuit's Mad River decision,222 in which 
Marjorie Rowland was fired as a high school guidance counselor 
"because she was a homosexual who revealed her sexual prefer­
ence-and, as the jury found, for n o  other reason. "223 Justice Bren­
nan's dissent from denial of certiorari to the Sixth Circuit shows 
how far appellate judges sometimes wiggle the facts in order to 
avoid vexing constitutional issues. Said Justice Brennan: " [T]hese 
maneuvers suggest only a desire to evade the central question: may 
a State dismiss a public employee based on her bisexual status 
alone? "22• 
And what of homosexual instructors at the college level? Ac­
cording to the experts, they agree that "at least a t  the University 
level, it would not be harmful to students, either homosexual or 
heterosexual, to be exposed to a homosexual professor who compe­
tently performs his duties."226 I should think most people would 
remain unperturbed by the prospect of a homosexual lecturer in 
the theater department, although President Trabant of the Uni­
versity of Delaware was quite miffed when Richard Aumiller got 
his name in the papers: "I really don't care what Mr. Aumiller does 
in his bedroom, but I consider it an effront [sic] to the University 
and to me as an individual that he insists in making his bedroom 
activities public information and a point of evangelistic endeavor 
to recruit more gays to his supposed cause."226 The court held 
President Trabant civilly liable for $10,000 in compensatory dam­
ages and for $5,000 punitive damages for violation of lecturer 
Aumiller's constitutional right of freedom of expression guaranteed 
by the first amendment.227 
Of course, freedom of speech is one thing, free association on 
campus, quite another. A few years ago the proposed marriage of 
two adult male homosexuals, one a university librarian, the other a 
law student, created quite a stir on the campus of the University of 
Minnesota. The Eighth Circuit upheld the Board of Regents' re-
221. 434 U.S. 879 (1977). 
222. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 730 F.2d 
444 (6th Cir . 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1373 (1985). 
223. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist . ,  Montgomery County, Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 
1373, 1373 (1985) (quoting 730 F . 2d 444, 454 ( 6th Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., dissenting)). 
224. 105 S. Ct .  at 1375. 
225. Aumiller v. University of Del . ,  434 F. Supp. 1273, 1291 n.53 (D. Del. 1977). 
226. Id. at 1283. 
227. Id. at 1311-12. 
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fusal to approve an employment contract with the librarian on the 
ground that his "personal conduct, as represented in the public 
and University news media, is not consistent with the best interest 
of the University."228 The scope of review was narrow; the appel­
late judges were quite unwilling  to overrule a determination "fall­
ing within the considerable discretion entrusted those charged with 
the heavy responsibility of supervising the administration of this 
nation's colleges and universities."229 This is the language of judi­
cial deference, not judicial activism, although the Eighth Circuit 
did caution that "this is not a case involving mere homosexual 
propensities on the part of a prospective employee. "230 In other 
words, personal status is one thing, personal conduct quite 
another. 
With this nutshell behind us, we are ready for Naragon v. 
Wharton. 231 In this case, a constitutional contest arose between 
Kristine Naragon, an excellent teacher in the Music School at 
LSU-to judge from her record-and Chancellor James Wharton, 
who removed Naragon from the classroom and put her into re­
search when controversy arose after Naragon had an affair with an 
LSU freshman music student. 
Naragon lost at trial. On appeal, Judge Reavley reacted suc­
cinctly: "Naragon persists. She argues that the real reason for her 
change of duties was that she is homosexual, and that denying her 
teaching duties for that reason is an Equal Protection violation 
and infringes her right to privacy as well as her First Amendment 
right of association. "232 The district court had found that 
Naragon's sexual preferences had nothing to do with the Univer­
sity's decision. But, as Judge Reavley responded, " [i]f that be the 
fact, we will be required to proceed no further. "233 
And what did the record show? Naragon was twenty-seven at 
the time the freshman music student moved into Naragon's home 
and became intimate with her teacher. The student's parents were 
quite upset by all this. Shouting matches ensued, and the matter 
unfortunately spilled over onto campus where u niversity adminis-
228. M cConnell v. Anders on, 45 1 F.2d 193, 194 (8th cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
1046 (1972). 
229. Id. a t  196. 
230. Id. 
231. 737 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1984). 
232. Id. a t  14 04 (footnote omitted). 
233. Id. at 1405. 
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trators could hardly sit still. Vice Chancellor Hargrave testified 
that there may be (not that there clearly and presently is) an ad­
verse effect upon the student, the University, and the effectiveness 
of the teacher when faculty have affairs with their students. Said 
Judge Reavley: 
Teachers are role models, good or bad, for students. The Vice -Chan­
cellor considered intimacy between a teacher and student a breach 
of professional ethics on the part of the teacher, and thought that it 
undermined the proper position and effectiveness of the teacher be­
cause of the perception of other students. Furthermore, if known, 
conduct of  this nature between teacher and student would be dam­
aging to relations with the public and parents, both present and 
prospective. 284 
The language of the court is restrained: "We would be very reluc­
tant to reject the reasoning of these educators or to overrule their 
de cision.  " 2 311 Judge Re a v l e y  procee d e d  n o  further . 
"AFFIRMED. "236 
Two observations support the majority's view. First, even in 
California a college teacher can be fired for unzipping a student's 
capri pants after class in the back seat of a car, as Stubblefield's237 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 1406. 
236. Id. 
237. Board of Trustees v. Stubblefield, 16 Cal. App. 3d 820, 823, 94 Cal. Rptr. 318, 320 
(1971): 
After teaching a class on the night of January 28, 1969, defendant drove a fe­
male student, and a member of that class, in his car to a location on a side street near 
Compton College and parked. The location is in an area of industrial construction 
and was not lighted. 
At some time after defendant parked, a Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff 
spotted defendant's car. The car appeared to the deputy to be abandoned and he 
went to investigate. When the deputy illuminated defendant's car with his headlights 
and searchlight, defendant then sat up. When the deputy approached defendant's 
car, illuminating the interior with his flashlight, he observed that defendant's pants 
were unzipped and lowered from the waist, exposing his penis. The student was nude 
from the waist up, and her capri pants were unzipped and open at the waist. 
On these facts, the court ventured to suggest that "[i]t would seem that, as a minimum, 
responsible conduct upon the part of a teacher, even at the college level, excludes meretri­
cious relationships with his students." Id. at 825, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 318. Accord, Goldin v. 
Board of Educ. of Central School Dist. No. 1,  35 N.Y.2d 534, 540, 324 N.E.2d 106, 108, 364 
N.Y.S.2d 440, 443 (1974) (disciplinary proceedings sustained on charges that a teacher 
"slept with an 18-year old female, a member of the 1973 graduating class of said school 
district, and a student for whom . . .  [the teacher] was a guidance counselor"). The New 
York Court of Appeals rejected the teacher's contention that the right of privacy recognized 
by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) precludes disciplinary proceedings against 
him on these charges. 35 N.Y.2d at 543, 324 N.E.2d at 110-11, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 446. 
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case shows. Second, the Louisiana State University's Faculty 
Handbook provides that faculty members are primarily scholars 
who strive to learn and teach. "They are counselors, models, 
tutors, guides, and defenders of reason and truth. "238 There is not 
one word in the book prohibiting the faculty from having sex with 
students; however, it does say the faculty "must exercise wisdom 
and fairness in dealing with other people, particularly with stu­
dents in their charge. "239 
Judge Goldberg is on the opposite side of the judicial fence: 
"Today's majority, like the trial court below, seemingly dqes not 
want to hear the clamoring of the difficult and extremely impor­
tant legal issue raised by this case."240 The record, as Judge 
Goldberg reads it, points in only one direction: "The record con­
tains uncontroverted evidence that the complaints of Ms. Doe's 
parents constituted a central factor in the University's decision to 
take action."241 Moreover, the record clearly indicates that the par­
ents opposed their daughter's relationship largely because of its 
homosexual aspect. Therefore, Judge Goldberg concludes: "The 
University's consideration of pressure from Mr. and Mrs. Doe un­
avoidably infects the school's action with the biases of the par­
ents."142 Such action is impermissible under the rule of Palmore v. 
Sidoti.243 In Palmore the maj ority held that " [p]rivate biases may 
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or 
indirectly give them e:ffect."2"" The Naragon dissent concludes: 
A very simple objection underlies my dissent today. The ma­
jority has refused to acknowledge a legal question which I believe is 
plainly presented. The extent to which the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits or circumscribes discrimi­
nation based upon an individual's sexual preference is a largely un­
resolved, yet immensely important legal issue of our day. But the 
obvious role of private biases in the University's action does not ring 
loudly enough in the majority's ears to attract their attention. I will 
not put a maxim silencer on the validated cries of discrimination 
and the calls to this Court for constitutional justice. 24� 
238. FACULTY HANDBOOK 4 (Louisiana State University 1985). 
239. Id. 
240. 737 F.2d at 1406 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 1408. 
243. 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984). 
244. Id. at 1882. 
245. 737 F.2d at 1408 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
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Now this is fine writing from a sensitive judge who over the 
years has reached out, as in the Cleburne Living Center2•� opini
.
on, 
to protect nonconforming victims of prejudice and pubhc excite­
ment. I have always admired Irving Goldberg's courage as a judge. 
He alone wrote to condemn Texas's sodomy statute on the merits 
in Baker v. Wade: "If ever there was a constitutional right to pri­
vacy, Texas has violated it by blatantly intruding into the private 
sex lives of fully consenting adults. "247 However, Jane Doe was a 
minor when she entered into her liaison with Ms. Naragon, and 
Palmore is a race case, not a case involving homosexual relations 
between faculty and student in the university context. In other 
words, one should not get swept away by cries for constitutional 
justice regardless of limiting circumstances. With all respect, Kris­
tine Naragon's case is not "the perfect case with the perfect client, 
one whose behavior is so exemplary that bigots cannot successfully 
raise a pretext to justify discriminatory action. "248 Nevertheless, 
others see homophobia in Judge Reavley's majority opinion.249 
VI. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND "CREATION­
SCIENCE" 
Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and 
246. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 
1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). See text accompanying notes 1-
19 supra. 
247. 769 F.2d at 293 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
248. Rivera, supra note 153, at 526 (footnote omitted). 
249. "The appellate decision should be read carefully to note how the choice of words 
indicates the underlying homophobia of the writer,'' says Professor Rhonda Rivera in her 
critique of the Naragon decision. Rivera, supra note 153, at 498. Professor Rivera sees 
homophobia behind several features of the court's decision, viz.: 
For example, the Fifth Circuit referred to the "undue influence" that Naragon exer­
cised over the student. The phrase is not found in the lower court opinion nor was 
any evidence presented that Naragon had any undue influence over the student in 
question. The influence could be that mere homosexuality was "undue influence." Do 
male teachers who live with and sleep with their female students exercise undue in­
fluence? Another interesting word used in the appellate opinion was that Naragon 
"controlled Doe's participation" in an interview with the dean of students. Appar­
ently, Naragon irritated the court, which commented "Naragon persists" at the be­
ginning of the paragraph which ends with the words: "none of the arguments about 
Naragon's constitutional rights need be discussed." Later the Fifth Circuit concluded 
"i� appeared that Doe was confused and not thinking independently, and the breach 
with her parents was a serious problem." Doe was living with Naragon during the 
whole trial and continued to do so afterwards. The use of the anonymous title Doe 
was not at the student's request, but at the request of her parents. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) .  
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Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction" is legally dead in 
the Fifth Circuit. Ho The statute required the teaching of what is 
called "Creation-Science" in Louisiana's public schools whenever 
evolution is taught. The Act defines "Creation-Science" as "the 
scientific evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific 
evidences."2111 The d�strict court struck down the Act holding that 
it lacked a legitimate secular purpose and would have the effect of 
promoting religion. The appellate court affirmed: "In truth," said 
Judges Brown, Politz, and Jolly, "this particular case is a simple 
one, subject to a simple disposal: the Act violates the establish­
ment clause of the first amendment because the purpose of the 
statute is to promote a religious belief."252 
Judge Jolly's panel opinion, which strikes me as a calm, law­
yer-like job, rests upon the premise that "irrespective of whether it 
is fully supported by scientific evidence, the theory of creation is a 
religious belief."253 Thus, Louisiana's Act "establishes a religious 
belief,"2114 that violated the first prong of Lemon v. Kurtzman.255 
250. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1985). 
251. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.3(2) (West 1982). The full text o f  the Act is set forth 
in an appendix to the opinion of the court in Aguillard, 765 F.2d at 1258·59. For a sympa­
thetic discussion of "creationism," see Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Ins truction 
in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978). According to Mr. Bird, 
Leading advocates of the creationist perspective do not endeavor to proscribe 
discussion of the general theory of evolution, as did the law involved in the Scopes 
trial. Nor in most areas do they attempt to introduce biblical creation into public 
schools. Instead they support "scientific creationism," a theory of the origin of the 
earth and life that employs scientific argument and not a sacred text in its challenge 
to the general theory. 
Id. at 517. (footnotes omitted). Mr. Bird proposes the neutralizatio n  of exclusive instruction 
in public schools of the general theory of evolution by offering alongside of Darwin instruc­
tion in scientific creationism: 
Instruction in scientific creationism, however, would serve to neutralize a public 
school course that exclusively presents the general theory of evolution. Spokesmen for 
this perspective do not seek to ban Darwin's Origin of Species o r  to exclude the gen­
eral theory from classrooms. Instead, their model of scientific creationism proposes 
special creation of matter and life, postulates stability of original plant and animal 
kinds, denies common ancestry of human beings with apes, and offers catastrophism, 
the view that unique and cataclysmic events occurred in the past, as the underlying 
principle of geologic history. This perspective suggests that the law of entropy, or 
change toward disorder, applies to the earth and living organisms, and that the world 
and life came into existence relatively recently. Textbooks presenting scientific crea­
tionism do not expound the Bible, but instead employ scientific discussion, and their 
authors are highly trained in science. 
Id. at 554-55. 
252. 765 F.2d at 1253. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 1256. 
682 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 31:639 
Notwithstanding Louisiana's solemn avowal of a secular purpose 
for the Act-"protecting academic freedom "2G6-the panel judges 
otherwise .  " [T]he Act continues the battle William Jennings Bryan 
carried to his grave. The Act's intended effect is to discredit evolu­
tion by c ounterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teach­
ing of creationism, a religious belief. The statute therefore is a law 
respecting a particular religious belief. "2G7 And the panel keeps its 
eyes open: "Our decision is not made in a vacuum, nor do we write 
on a clean slate. We must recognize that the theory of creation is a 
religious belief. We cannot divorce ourselves from the historical 
fact that the controversy between the proponents o f  evolution and 
creationism has religious overtones. "2G8 According to the panel's 
perception, the statute teaches religion in the public schools, never 
mind the rubric "science, "  and therefore the Balanced Treatment 
Act is, on its face, "inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom 
as it is universally understood. "2G9 
Louisiana's suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied, but 
only by the thinnest margin possible, eight to seven. 260 Judge Gee's 
dissent is stinging: 
[T]he Louisiana statute requires no more than that neither theory 
about the origins of life and matter be misrepresented as fact, and 
that if scientific evidence supporting either view of how these things 
came about be presented in public schools, that supporting the other 
must be-so that within the r easonable limits of the curriculum, the 
subject of origins will be discussed in a balanced manner if it is dis­
cussed at all. I see nothing illiberal about such a requirement, nor 
can I imagine that Galileo or Einstein would have found fault with 
it. Indeed, so far as I am aware even Ms. O'Hair has never asked for 
more than equal time.261 
. 255.. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) presented the following tripartite test: (1) the statute 
m 
.
question must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must 
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) the statute must not foster "an excessive gov­
ernment entanglement with religion." The Fifth Circuit's decision is limited to the "purpose 
prong" of the Lemon test: "Our decision today requires only that we consider the purpose 
prong of the Lemon test, for as the Supreme Court recently expressed, '[N)o consideration 
of the second or third criteria is necessary if a statute does not have a clearly secular pur­
pose.' "  765 F.2d at 1255 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 (1985)). 
256. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §. 17:286.1 (West 1982) ("This Subpart is enacted for the 
purposes of protecting academic freedom."). 
257. 765 F.2d at 1257. 
258. Id. at 1256 (footnote omitted) .  
259. Id. at 1257. 
260. 778 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1985). 
261. Id. at 226-27 (Gee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). 
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According to Judge Gee, the panel is all wrong to rely on its "vis­
ceral knowledge regarding what must have m otivated the legisla­
tors. It sifts their hearts and minds, divines their motive for requir­
ing that truth be taught, and strikes down the law that requires it. 
This approach effectually makes a farce of the judicial exercise of 
discerning legislative intent."262 Furthermore, the dissent objects 
to denying Louisiana a chance to defend its statute at trial since 
record affidavits from highly qualified scientists affirmed that 
evolution is not an established fact and that there is strong evi­
dence that life and the universe came about in a different manner. 
"At the least, these affidavits make a fact issue that those proposi­
tions are true. For purposes of reviewing the summary judgment 
which our panel's opinion affirms, then, the propositions stated 
must be taken as established: there are two bona fide views. "263 
Judge Gee concludes: "I should have thought that requiring the 
truth to be taught on any subject displayed its own secular war­
rant, one at the heart of the scientific method itself. "264 
It is probable that the approach of Wallace v. Jaffree266 to Al­
abama's "Moment of Silence" law is enough to condemn Louisi­
ana's statute-if its purpose is what the panel says it is. Neverthe­
less, it is disturbing that Louisiana was denied an opportunity to 
go to trial over its law.266 
Perhaps the majority believed that a trial on the merits would 
only make Louisiana look foolish. For the moment, Judge Jolly has 
had the last word: 
First, as writer of the panel opinion, I off er my apologies to the 
majority of this court for aligning it with the forces of darkness and 
anti-truth. Second, I do not personally align myself with the dissent­
ers in their commitment to the search for eternal truth through 
state edicts. Third, I commend to the dissenters a serious rereading 
of the majority opinion that they may recognize the hyperbole of the 
262. Id. at 227. 
263. Id. at 226 (emphasis by Judge Gee). 
264. Id. at 228. 
265. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's find­
ing that the one-minute period of silence in all public schools was unconstitutional.). 
266. In the Arkansas case, McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. 
Ark. 1982), aff'd, 723 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1983), Arkansas's "Balanced Treatment for Creation­
Science and Evolution-Science Act" was declared unconstitutional as violative of the estab­
lishment clause, but this ruling followed a trial on the merits; the State was not shut out of 
court on summary judgment. One wonders why Louisian a  was denied its day in court when 
Arkansas got one. 
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opmwn in which they join. And, finally, I respectfully s�bmit, t�e 
panel opinion speaks for itself, modestly and moderately, 1f one will 
allow its words to be carefully heard.267 
Louisiana's Attorney General will appeal to the Supreme 
Court. 2ss This decision means the Justices will have to read our 
Circuit's competing opinions with an eye to substance, that is, 
through the lens of the Establishment Clause. 
VII. MIS CELLANEOUS KNOTS 
"[U]ntying little knots n ever seems drudgery, "269 Holmes 
wrote to Dr. Wu in one of their le tters. The j u dges of the Fifth 
Circuit appear to enjoy untying the miscellaneous legal knots of 
the docket. 
For example, Mr. Hill's case from Houston210 matches Judges 
Rubin and Higginbotham in a n  unravelling of the overbreadth doc­
triµe of Broadrick v. Oklahoma.211 Here is Houston's ordinance in 
question: 
Sec. 34- 1 1. Assaulting or inter[ ering with policemen. (a) It shall be 
unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, 
molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his 
duty, or any person summone d  to aid in making an arrest.272 
267. Aguillard, 778 F.2d at 228 (Jolly, J., responding to dissent). Judge Jolly's insist­
ing on the last word by publishing a response to Judge Gee's dissent is unusual, although 
not unprecedented in the reports. Compare Judge Bork's published response to his dissen­
tiant District of Columbia Circuit colleagues in Dronenberg v. Zeck, 746 F.2d 1579, 1582·84 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (denying rehearing en bane). 
268. In his press release announcing the appeal, Attorney General William J. Guste, 
Jr., said that Judge Gee's dissent was the most forceful he had read in his tenure as Attor­
ney General. He added that the dissent, joined in by seven judges, was a clear invitation to 
seek review of this controversial case by the Supreme Court of the United States. Office of 
the Attorney General, State of Louisiana, Department of Justice, Press Release, Dec. 23, 
1985, at 1. "With the court divided eight to seven, I feel an obligation to bring this matter 
before the Supreme Court of the United States for its decision," Guste concluded. Id. at 5. 
269. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to John C.H. Wu, Sept. 20, 1923, reproduced in Jus­
TICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: Hrs BooK NoTICE AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS, 
Pt. 3, Chapter Heading Recent Letters to Dr. Wu 167 (H.C. Shriver ed. 1936). Dr. Wu 
(1899-1986) was formerly Judge of the Shanghai Provisional Court, Principal of the Com­
parative Law School of China, and Member of the Law Codification Commission. Id. at 151 
n.1. The Holmes-Wu correspondence began in 1921 when Wu was a student at Michigan 
Law School and Holmes was on the Supreme Court in Washington. Their letters are a lost 
treasure on the shelf of the law library. 
270. Hill v. City of Houston, Tex., 764 F.2d 1 156 (5th Cir. 1985). 
271. 413 U.S. 601 ( 1973). 
272. 764 F.2d at 1158. 
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At first glance this law may appear perfectly sensible. The ordi­
nance states "or in any manner oppose," a fairly broad meaning 
that obviously involves speech, possibly protected speech. Here is a 
sample of Judge Rubin's thinking for the majority: 
The conduct literally proscribed by the ordinance includes 
much that is completely lawful. The dictionary defines "oppose," for 
example, to include, "to stand in the way of; hinder or obstruct," "to 
have an adverse opinion concerning" or "to offer arguments 
against." . . .  Applying these definitions to the second clause of the 
ordinance, it is clear that the statute affects a broad range of pro­
tected activities. If a mother pleads with a policeman to "spare my 
baby" while the policeman arrests her son in front of their home, 
she has "opposed" the policeman in the execution of his duties 
In short, the second clause of Section 32-ll(a) encompasses 
mere verbal as well as physical conduct . . . . The areas of protected 
conduct encompassed by the ordinance are more than niere "margi­
nal applications in which the statute would infringe on First 
Amendment values." They comprise a substantial range of protected 
speech and verbal communications that might be deterred by the 
present wording of the statute.273 
Down went Houston's ordinance, notwithstanding Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma 's admonition that the overbreadth doctrine is "mani­
festly strong medicine" which should be applied "sparingly" and 
"only as a last resort. "27• 
In his dissent, Judge Higginbotham would construe the ordi­
nance "to proscribe only speech which is not made with a bona fide 
intention to exercise a constitutional right, but solely with the in­
tention of interfering with police officers who are attempting to 
carry out lawful police functions, and which actually does create 
such interference."276 The dissent would apply Broadrick's require­
ment of substantial overbreadth more stringently: "The require­
ment of substantiality accommodates our constitutional devotion 
to the decision of concrete cases, as well as our devotion to separa­
tion of powers and federalism,"278 says Judge Higginbotham. "A 
diluted substantiality requirement expresses a perceived primacy 
of First Amendment values over Article III checks of judicial 
power and defined judicial roles, and in doing so, eschews what I 
273. 764 F.2d at 1163-64 (footnotes omitted). 
274. 413 U.S. at 613. 
275. 764 F.2d at 1172 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
276. Id. 
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see to be a fundamental analytical tool of constitutional adjudica­
tion-that of structural inference, text and history. "211 
Given Colten u. Kentucky,218 I should think Judge Higginbot­
ham has the better of the argument, although the question is close. 
Doubtless the majority and dissenting opinions in Hill u. City of 
Houston would make fine reading in a first amendment seminar, 
and when the case is reargue d  en bane before the full Fifth Circuit, 
as it will be,279 the professor would do well to adjourn class to 
Camp Street where the books connect with life. 280 
Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital District281 is our second 
miscellaneous knot. This one divides Judges Rubin and Goldberg, 
a challenging split, with Chief Judge Clark concurring in the mid­
dle. The case involves the old problem of discrimination against 
osteopathic physicians, in favor of allopathic healers, with a new 
Texas twist. Under current Texas law, state agencies are forbidden 
to differentiate among physicians solely on the basis of their aca­
demic medical degrees. 282 In earlier days, the Supreme Court sus­
tained such discrimination, holding in Hayman u. City of Galues­
ton283 that a hospital's decision to exclude osteopaths was neither 
arbitrary nor unreasonable because it was based on the necessity of 
choosing between competing modes of treatment. This was 1927, 
although as recently as 1979, in Berman v. Florida Medical 
Center, Inc.,28" the Fifth Circuit followed Hayman in dictum, opin­
ing that a public hospital may deny staff privileges to a physician 
simply because he is an osteopathic doctor. 
277. Id. 
278. 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
279. Rehearing en bane granted, 764 F.2d 1 156 (5th Cir. 1985). 
280. The challenge of connecting the books with life is perennial in legal education. 
Long ago Frederick Pollock said of his classes in a letter to Holmes, "Both from my own 
experience and from information I believe students' main trouble is to make out the connex­
ion of the book-law they are examined i n  with the live business of the Courts." Frederick 
Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Feb. 1 1, 1924, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF Mk JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 127 
(M.D. Howe ed. 1941). Holmes answered Pollock's letter saying: "I quite understand the 
difficulties of connecting the books with life. I remember a chap who had just left the Law 
School writing to another that he had seen a real writ (or deed, I forget)." Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock, March 7, 1924, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETI'ERS at 128. 
281. 755 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1985). Different results were reached on rehearing en bane. 
778 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1985). 
282. Texas Medical Practice Act, TEx. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, Subchapter A, 
' 1.02(9) (Vernon Supp. 1984). 
283. 273 U.S. 414 (1�27). 
284. 600 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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Given these rulings, one would not expect Dr. Stern to win his 
constitutional case in federal court, but win he did-and on state 
statutory grounds judicially elevated into a federal equal protec­
tion violation. According to Judge Rubin: "state agency's discrimi­
natory action when state law commands equality is a patent denial 
of [federal] equal protection to those denied equality."285 
Now this holding is perplexing. State statutory protection is 
one thing; federal equal protection is another. It is important to 
keep these theoretical canvasses hanging separately. As Judge 
Goldberg points out in dissent: 
[T]his is a novel theory of equal protection, without support i n  our 
precedents. Previously, I had thought that a violation of state law 
was a violation of state law; I had not realized that it could also give 
rise to a violation of federal equal protection. Although I believe 
that I have always been a stout and ardent defender of equal protec­
tion, I fail to see how state law can provide the basis of a federal 
equal protection claim. 288 
A majority of the judges in active service have voted in favor of 
granting a .rehearing en banc287 so that the full Fifth Circuit will 
285. 755 F.2d at 432. 
286. Id. at 437 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Judge Goldberg continued: 
While I have little sympathy with efforts to restrict a litigant's access to federal 
courts where federal rights are involved, I believe, in contrast to the majority, that 
infringements on rights created by state law are best left to state courts. This conclu­
sion is far more compatible than the majority's with the principles of federalism that 
underlie many of our basic constitutional doctrines, including the doctrines that state 
court determinations of state law are final, and that federal courts should refrain 
from exercising jurisdiction in order to avoid needless conflict with the administration 
by a state of its own affairs . . . . Although the majority's theory could be defended 
in terms of "keeping the states honest," I believe that the enforcement of state law is 
a matter primarily of concern to the states. Ultimately, I believe that the majority's 
theory trivializes equal protection by shifting attention away from its primary func­
tion: imposing substantive restrictions on the ways in which government can govern. 
Id. at 440-41 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original) . 
287. 755 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1985), reh'g en bane granted. Editor's note: On rehearing 
en bane, the full Fifth Circuit, by a vote of 10 to 5, rejected the panel's per se equal protec­
tion analysis and reversed the district court's conclusion of unconstitutionality. Judge Hig­
ginbotham's majority opinion noted: 
The guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, its requirement that state laws be ap­
plied in the same way to those entitled to equal treatment and its promise of protec­
tion from arbitrary or irrational state action, are guarantees that turn on federal con­
stitutional standards of equality and rationality rather than on state standards. 
Converting alleged violations of state law into federal equal protection and due pro­
cess claims improperly bootstraps state law into the Constitution. In doing so, this 
novel approach would expand the scope of the fourteenth amendment, would render 
its meaning less certain, and would serve no legitimate policy. 
688 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 3 1 :639 
have to untie this knot as well. Regardless of the outcome, here are 
judges plainly enjoying their work. 
VIII. A CENTENNIAL FAREWELL: WHAT IS A LA WYER, 
WHY BE ONE? 
I want to conclude with a centennial word from Justice Black 
directed to lawyers who read these pages. 
Hugo Black loved his copy of Tacitus288 just as he loved "that 
little book of the Constitution "  he always carried in his pocket.289 
The Judge made his own index by writing notes to himself on the 
back pages of the book. "What is a lawyer, why be one?-394" is 
one such entry, and if you turn to page 394 you find what Tacitus, 
the Roman lawyer and historian, said about our p rofession 2,000 
years ago. The passage caught Hugo Black's eye: 
Can we possibly be employed to better purpose, than in the exercise 
of an art which enables a man, upon all occasions, to support the 
interest of his friend, to protect the rights of the stranger, to defend 
the cause of the injured, to strike with terror and dismay his open 
and secret adversaries, himself secure the while, and guarded, as it 
Stern v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane). Judge 
Rubin, joined by Chief Judge Clark, and Judges Politz, Tate, and Johnson, dissented: "I 
suggest that it is per se not only unlawful, but arbitrary and capricious, hence not rational, 
for a state agency intentionally to create a discriminatory classification forbidden by a valid 
state law." Id. at 1065. Judge Rubin's dissent concluded: 
The fourteenth amendment forbids the state and its agencies to discriminate 
against any class of persons. It is a b ulwark against prejudice, against state action 
that condemns without rational basis. The clause was adopted to assure not only that 
states enact nondiscriminatory laws but also that they administer state law equally 
and fairly. The majority opinion refuses to apply the literal mandate of the Constitu­
tion and ignores the history that led to its enactment. It condones the bigotry of an 
allopathic-dominated state hospital district that refuses to be bothered by either the 
state law, the federal constitution, or the facts. 
Id. at 1067. 
288. II THE WORKS OF TACITUS (Oxford Trans., rev., New York 1869). 
289. During his 1968 CBS television interview, Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, 
the first ever with a sitting Justice, the Justice was asked why he always carried "that little 
book of the Constitution" in his pocket. According to Mrs. Black, who witnessed the inter­
view being made, 
[t]he question lighted up Hugo's face with another of those smiles that endeared 
him to just about everyone. Hugo had a confession to make and he didn't mind mak­
ing it before millions: "Because I don't know it by heart. I can't-my memory is not 
that good. When I say something about it, I want to quote it precisely. And so I 
usually carry it in my pocket." 
-
E. Black, Hugo Black: A Memorial Protrait, 1982 Y.B. SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'v 72, 78. 
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were, by an imperishable potency?290 
At this point, Justice Black substituted his own word in the margin 
for the word "potency," rendering the last line "secure the while, 
and guarded, as it were, by an imperishable integrity." 
290. A Dialogue Concerning Oratory, in II THE WORKS OF TACITUS 394 (Oxford 
Trans., rev., New York 1869). 
